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Eyes on the Prize, Head in the Sand: 
Filling the Due Process Vacuum in 
Federally Administered Contests
Steven L. Schooner* and Nathaniel E. Castellano**
Introduction: The Next Gold Rush of Innovation?
From Columbus’ brash proposal to discover an Atlantic route to the East 
Indies and Lewis and Clark’s epic cross-country expedition to the Pacific 
Coast, to the Space Race that first landed humans on the moon, sovereigns 
have inspired transformational quests and pioneered endeavors that slashed the 
Gordian Knots of their time. While innovation occurs constantly, incentivized 
by familiar devices like patents, research grants, public procurement, and tax 
incentives, some barriers (whether scientific, technical, or conceptual) prove 
so stubborn that they demand a different type of tool, a more dramatic and 
exciting gesture: a prize.1
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1 See Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 115, 116–19 (2003). 
For recent academic discussions of prize contests, see id. at 211–35; Stuart M. Benjamin 
& Art K. Rai, Fixing Innovation Policy: A Structural Perspective, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 
56–80 (2008); Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents-Prizes De-
bate, 92 TEX. L. REV. 303, 317–19 (2013); Saul Levmore, The Impending iPrize Revolution 
in Intellectual Property Law, 93 B.U. L. REV. 139, 151–54 (2013); Jonathan R. Siegel, Law 
and Longitude, 84 TUL. L. REV. 1, 6–27 (2009).
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Prizes—the more genteel term for “bounties”—are not new:2 in 1714, the 
British government, craving a method for accurately determining a ship’s 
longitude at sea, offered the Longitude Prize, incentivizing John Harrison to 
invent the modern-day chronometer.3 In 1791, the French Chemical Industry 
took off after Nicolas LeBlanc claimed a 2,400 Livre prize offered by King 
Louis XVI for developing a commercially viable artificial process to produce 
Alkali.4 In 1861, the aptly (if inartfully) named Confederate Prize for Inven-
tions that Sink or Destroy Union Ships spurred the deployment of the H.L. 
Hunley, heralded as the first submarine to sink a warship in combat.5 In 1927, 
Charles Lindbergh seized the $25,000 Orteig Prize, in the now legendary 
“Spirit of St. Louis,” by completing the first nonstop flight from New York to 
Paris.6 More recently, SpaceShipOne’s 2004 re-entry into earth’s atmosphere, 
2 For a detailed compilation of historical and modern prizes, see generally KNOWLEDGE 
ECOLOGY INT’L, SELECTED INNOVATION PRIZES AND REWARD PROGRAMS (2008), http://
keionline.org/misc-docs/research_notes/kei_rn_2008_1.pdf [hereinafter KEI COMPILATION].
3 See generally RICHARD DUNN & REBEKAH HIGGITT, SHIPS, CLOCKS, & STARS: THE QUEST 
FOR LONGITUDE (2014); DAVA SOBEL, LONGITUDE: THE TRUE STORY OF A LONE GENIUS 
WHO SOLVED THE GREATEST SCIENTIFIC PROBLEM OF HIS TIME (1995); Siegel, supra note 
1; KEI COMPILATION, supra note 2, at 35.
As early as 1567, European sovereigns offered prizes for a solution to the vexing problem 
of accurately determining a ship’s longitude at sea. See DUNN & HIGGITT, supra note 3, at 36. 
Heavily travelled channels subjected ships and their fortunes to risk of pirates; but without a 
means to determine longitude, leaving those familiar channels risked crashes on unexpected 
shores at night or becoming lost at sea. Id. at 16–19. An accurate method of keeping time 
aboard a ship would solve the longitude problem, but no extant timepiece could maintain 
accuracy in harsh sea conditions. Id. at 57–63. Longitude could also be derived from the 
moon’s placement in the stars, but no one at the time had mapped the moon’s motion across 
the heavens. Id. at 51–57.
In 1714, reacting to public outcry following a particularly tragic crash, the British Par-
liament commissioned the Longitude Board to award a small fortune to whomever solved 
the riddle. Id. at 32–39. John Harrison, a self-taught clockmaker, eventually created five 
timepieces, all of which accurately predicted longitude at sea. Id. at 77–92, 121. Despite his 
ingenuity, the board deemed that his performance fell short of the Longitude Act’s require-
ments and refused to award the full prize value. Id. at 121–22. Not until 1773, almost sixty 
years after the competition began, did Parliament intervene and resolve the dispute. Id. In 
October 2014, the authors enjoyed the opportunity to visit the UK’s National Maritime 
Museum’s exhibit marking the tercentenary of the Longitude Act of 1714, Ships, Clocks & 
Stars: The Quest for Longitude, in Greenwich. See Ships, Clocks & Stars: The Quest for Longitude, 
ROYAL MUSEUMS GREENWICH, http://www.rmg.co.uk/whats-on/events/ships-clocks-stars 
(last visited Jan. 17, 2015).
4 KEI COMPILATION, supra note 2, at 44.
5 Id. at 45–46.
6 Id. at 12. Remarkably, two books about Lindbergh and his exploits ultimately won the 
Pulitzer Prize (for Biography and Autobiography, of course, not innovation). See Biography 
or Autobiography, THE PULITZER PRIZES, http://www.pulitzer.org/bycat/Biography-or-Auto-
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earning the privately sponsored $10 million Ansari X-Prize,7 appears to have 
kick-started the modern era of prizes.8
Unlike the conventional, heavily regulated,9 cumbersome, scandal-laden, 
and oft-criticized vehicles they tend to replace (i.e., government contracts and 
grants), prizes shift risk to the private sector and provide access to previously 
untapped innovative talent.10 Unlike traditional, bilateral research and devel-
opment (“R&D”) contracts, where the government typically chooses a single 
(or very small number of ) business partner(s) in anticipation of performance, 
prizes engage a theoretically infinite number of contestants who are only 
rewarded if and when one or more contestants satisfy the contest criteria.11 
biography (last visited Jan. 17, 2015) (citing A. SCOTT BERG, LINDBERGH (1998); CHARLES 
A. LINDBERGH & REEVE LINDBERGH, THE SPIRIT OF ST. LOUIS (1953)).
7 See KEI COMPILATION, supra note 2, at 13; ANSARI XPRIZE, http://ansari.xprize.org/ 
(last visited Jan. 17, 2015).
8 Joseph Lampel, Pushkar P. Jha & Ajay Bhalla, Test-Driving the Future: How Design 
Competitions Are Changing Innovation, 26 ACADEMY OF MGMT PERSPECTIVE 71 (May, 2012):
Design competitions … are an increasingly popular tool for purposes that range from 
fast-tracking nascent technologies to focusing entrepreneurial attention on pressing 
social needs. . . . The current generation of design competitions, while still focused on 
solving problems and pushing technological frontiers, has overcome [prior limitations 
such as “fragmented entrepreneurial fields and diffused communities of knowledge”] 
through the transformative impact of open innovation, crowdsourcing systems, and 
powerful Internet platforms.”
9 Federal government contracts are regulated by the notoriously complex Federal Acquisi-
tion Regulations (“FAR”) found in title 48 of the Code of Federal Regulations (“C.F.R.”), 
see 48 C.F.R. § 1.101 (2013), and available online in an official version at www.acquisition.
gov/far. The government commenced the process of consolidating the wildly diverse and 
disaggregated universe of federal grant regulations with the recent introduction of the Office 
of Management and Budget (“OMB”) Super Circular. Uniform Administrative Require-
ments, Cost Principles, and Audit Requirements for Federal Awards; Final Rule, 78 Fed. 
Reg. 78,590 (Dec. 26, 2013) (to be codified at 2 C.F.R. Chapter I, and Chapter II, Parts 
200, 215, 220, 225, and 230), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-12-26/
pdf/2013-30465.pdf.
10 See generally 2009 Strategy for American Innovation, infra note 18.
11 Government contracting is not the only area where current public innovation policy 
creates perverse R&D incentives, and prizes are believed to be the solution:
The current system of financing research and development (“R&D”) for new medicines is 
deeply flawed by the impact of high prices on access to medicine, the wasteful spending on 
marketing and R&D for medically unimportant products, and the lack of investment in areas 
of greatest public interest and need. It can and should be replaced with something better….
Reforming the way we pay for R&D on new medicines involves a simple but powerful 
idea. Rather than give drug developers the exclusive rights to sell products, the government 
would award innovators money: large monetary “prizes” tied to the actual impact of the 
invention on improvements in health care outcomes that successful products actually deliver.
 THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT BAR JOURNAL VOL. , NO. 
Contests shift the risk of failure (i.e., the risk that effort will be expended 
with no compensation) to the contestants. Rather than agreeing to reimburse 
the private sector for effort expended in advancing the state of the art,12 the 
Government only pays for success.13 At the same time, deploying innumerable 
independent research initiatives—compared to preselecting one or a hand-
ful—is a double–edged sword, as it increases the odds that the government 
will gain exposure to novel approaches to traditionally vexing problems.14
Moreover, the unique nature of public competition spurs private sector 
interest in these innovation-inducing contests.15 Innovators invest their time 
and energy competing in contests not only in the hope of reaping significant 
financial rewards, but also seeking the priceless imprimatur that accompanies 
success.16 Winning a high-profile government contest showers public attention 
of the type that marketing agencies can only promise (but likely not deliver) 
James Love, & Tim Hubbard, The Big Idea: Prizes To Stimulate R&D for New Medicines, 
82 CHICAGO-KENT L. REV. 1519, 1520 (2007), available at http://studentorgs.kentlaw.iit.
edu/cklawreview/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/vol82no3/Love.pdf.
12 The FAR explains that:
Unlike contracts for supplies and services, most [research and development] contracts 
are directed toward objectives for which the work or methods cannot be precisely 
described in advance. It is difficult to judge the probabilities of success or required effort 
for technical approaches, some of which offer little or no early assurance of full success.
48 C.F.R. § 35.002 (emphasis added).
13 Brad Rourke, Promoting Innovation: Prizes, Challenges and Open Grantmaking, THE 
CASE FOUND. 6 (Aug. 23, 2010), http://casefoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/
PromotingInnovation.pdf.
14 See infra Part I.A.
15 “Some experts view the non-compensation portion of prizes as important, and some-
times more important, than the potential financial reward.” Deborah D. Stine, Congressional 
Research Service, Federally Funded Innovation Inducement Prizes 2 (2009) (employing the 
terms “inducement prizes” or “innovation inducement prizes”), at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/
misc/R40677.pdf. Also, it is important to distinguish the prize competitions discussed here 
from, among other things: (1) drawings, lotteries, or games of chance; and (2) recognition 
prizes, which span a diverse spectrum from, e.g., the Academy Awards (motion pictures), 
http://oscar.go.com/; the Nobel Prizes in Chemistry, Economic Sciences, Literature, Peace, 
Physics, and Physiology or Medicine, http://www.nobelprize.org/; or the nascent (and, ap-
parently, expanding) Breakthrough Prizes (“The Breakthrough Prize in Fundamental Physics 
was founded in 2012 by Yuri Milner to recognize those individuals who have made profound 
contributions to human knowledge. It is open to all physicists—theoretical, mathematical, 
experimental—working on the deepest mysteries of the Universe.”), https://breakthrough-
prize.org/. For further discussion as to the distinction between incentive and recognition 
prizes, see infra note 50.
16 The euphoric investments made by prize contestants competing for the status and 
publicity associated with winning is analogous, albeit imperfectly, to the immense, arguably 
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and few firms could afford.17 Exploiting the renewed popularity and seemingly 
unlimited potential of prizes, President Obama formally encouraged federal 
agencies to adopt prize contests in his 2009 Strategy for American Innovation.18 
Soon after, Congress passed the America COMPETES Reauthorization Act 
of 2010 (“COMPETES II” or “The Act”),19 authorizing all federal agencies 
to conduct prize contests.20
Within two years, fifty-eight agencies sponsored over two hundred contests.21 
According to a recent Deloitte report, which provides extensive guidance for 
utilizing and developing prize contests with a unique focus on the public 
sector, by mid-2014, the federal government sponsored some 350 prizes.22 
Professor Steve Kelman of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government promptly 
described prize contests as “one of the single largest changes in government 
management in the last decade.”23
Despite the euphoria, a reality check is in order: the benefits of prize con-
tests come at a cost, and not all contests generate success stories.24 For every 
ebullient prizewinner, contests breed potentially unlimited losers, many of 
whom invested heavily in their efforts.25 “Losers”—many of whom suggested 
irrational, private sector investments made to win the coveted Baldrige Award. See generally 
David A. Garvin, How the Baldrige Award Really Works, 69 HARV. BUS. REV. 80 (1991).
17 See infra notes 54–55.
18 EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NAT’L ECON. COUNCIL & OFFICE OF SCI. & TECH. 
POLICY, A STRATEGY FOR AMERICAN INNOVATION: DRIVING TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE GROWTH 
AND QUALITY JOBS 17 (2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/
innovation-whitepaper.pdf [hereinafter 2009 STRATEGY FOR AMERICAN INNOVATION]; see also 
OFFICE OF SCI. & TECH. POLICY, IMPLEMENTATION OF FEDERAL PRIZE AUTHORITY: PROGRESS 
REPORT 4 (2012), http://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/files/competes_report_on_prizes_fi-
nal.pdf [hereinafter 2012 OSTP PROGRESS REPORT].
19 America COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-358, § 105(a), 
124 Stat. 3982, 3989 (2011) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 3719(b) (2012)); see also 2012 OSTP 
PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 18.
20 See 15 U.S.C. § 3719(b) (2012); see also 2012 OSTP PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 18.
21 Richard W. Walker, What 205 Prize Challenges Have Taught Government Agencies, 
BREAKING GOV’T (Sept. 10, 2012, 9:01 AM), http://breakinggov.com/2012/09/10/what-
205-prize-challenges-have-taught-government-agencies/.
22 See JESSE GOLDHAMMER ET AL., DELOITTE CONSULTING LLP, THE CRAFT OF INCENTIVE 
PRIZE DESIGN: LESSONS FROM THE PUBLIC SECTOR 2, 6 (2014), available at http://dupress.
com/articles/the-craft-of-incentive-prize-design/.
23 Steve Kelman, Government Contests Come of Age, FCW (July 11, 2014, 12:02 PM), 
http://fcw.com/blogs/lectern/2014/07/kelman-challenges-come-of-age.aspx.
24 See DUNN & HIGGITT, supra note 3, at 121–22.
25 “Society may find the aftermath of competition, that is the presence of losers, to be 
unacceptable.” B.J. Nalebuff & J.E. Stiglitz, Prizes and Incentives: Towards a General Theory 
of Compensation and Competition, 4 BELL J. OF ECONOMICS 21, 40 (1983).
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excellent solutions—feel unfairly judged, wronged, and even cheated by 
their government, and—particularly when their disappointment cannot be 
objectively explained or justified—do not always leave the field quietly. In ad-
dition to the chronometer, the historically enduring legacy of the eponymous 
Longitude Prize was the dispute between John Harrison and the Longitude 
Board.26 Although Harrison’s invention accurately predicted longitude at sea, 
the Longitude Board, which administered the contest, never awarded Har-
rison the contest’s prize.27 A decades-long drama followed, wherein Harrison 
(and his heirs) accused the Board of bias, conflict of interest, and wrongfully 
withholding the prize despite Harrison’s satisfaction of the legislative require-
ments.28 History forgotten is doomed to repeat itself.29 Unfortunately, amidst 
the current euphoria, there is no evidence that the U.S. government has an-
ticipated prize contest disputes, let alone provided an obvious, well-defined, 
or straightforward means for contestants to obtain judicial or administrative 
review or, more broadly, any form of due process to resolve those disputes.
It did not take long for modern-day equivalents to the Longitude Prize 
dispute to appear, albeit on a more modest scale. In April 2013, the Federal 
Trade Commission (“FTC”) split a $50,000 prize between two contestants 
26 See Siegel, supra note 1, at 117.
27 See id. at 24–27.
28 See id. at 17–26.
29 Or, in other words: “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat 
it.” GEORGE SANTAYANA, 7 THE LIFE OF REASON OR THE PHASES OF HUMAN PROGRESS: 
INTRODUCTION AND REASON IN COMMON SENSE 172 (Marianne S. Wokeck & Martin A. 
Coleman eds., MIT Press ed. 2011) (1905). In honor of the Longitude Act of 1714’s ter-
centenary, NESTA (“an innovation charity with a mission to help people and organisations 
bring great ideas to life”) and UK Innovate are launching the Longitude Prize 2014, which 
is a £10 million prize fund to help solve one of the greatest issues of our time. See About 
Us: The History, LONGITUDE PRIZE 2014, http://www.longitudeprize.org/history; NESTA, 
http://www.nesta.org.uk/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2015); see also Inclusive Technology Prize, 
NESTA, http://www.nesta.org.uk/project/inclusive-technology-prize (last visited Jan. 17, 
2015). The public submitted topical suggestions and ultimately voted to select antibiotics 
as the prize theme: “The challenge for Longitude Prize 2014 will be set to create a cheap, 
accurate, rapid and easy-to-use point of care test kit for bacterial infections.” The Challenge, 
LONGITUDE PRIZE 2014, http://www.longitudeprize.org/challenge/antibiotics. The contest 
guidelines, disclosed in November 2014, proved disappointing. The guidelines permit any-
one with a disagreement regarding the process to “contact the Longitude Prize ... [at which 
time the board] will respond to [the] enquiry within seven working days. If [that] response 
is unsatisfactory[, the board] will provide ... further information about how .. [to] escalate 
[the] appeal.” In other words, the the modern-era LongitudeCommission acknowledged that 
disputes may arise, but, nonetheless, failed to incorporate a practical and credible dispute 
resolution mechanism into its procedures. See Prize Rules, LONGITUDE PRIZE 2014 (NOV. 
2014), http://www.nesta.org.uk/sites/default/files/longitude_prize_rules_v11.pdf.
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in its Robocall Challenge, which sought effective tools to block annoying, 
automated telephone calls.30 When David Frankel’s entrepreneurial invention 
failed to win the prize,31 Frankel contested the FTC’s decision.32 After the FTC 
(allegedly) rebuffed Frankel’s request for scoring details comparing his sub-
mission to the winner, Frankel filed a Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) 
request. The FTC (again, allegedly) provided him with some limited scoring 
data and an agency contact who (again, allegedly) was somewhat willing to 
hear and respond to Frankel’s concerns.33 Dissatisfied with the FTC’s respon-
siveness, Frankel filed a bid protest at the Government Accountability Office 
(“GAO”).34 When the GAO dismissed his challenge for lack of jurisdiction,35 
Frankel brought suit in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims (“COFC”),36 where, 
a year later, Judge Allegra recently denied the Government’s motion to dismiss 
for lack of jurisdiction.37
 Regardless of the ultimate outcome of Frankel’s efforts, prize contests come 
in so many different variations that the outcome of the Robocall Challenge 
dispute will not alleviate the need for voluminous and inefficient jurisdictional 
litigation of disputes that arise from other contests.38 By failing to waive its 
sovereign immunity or designate a dispute resolution forum, the government 
burdens its own lawyers with inefficient litigation, while saddling disappointed 
contestants with the onus of finding a forum with jurisdiction, not to mention 
the uncertainty of not knowing what, if any, due process might be available. 
Accordingly, this article considers avenues that disappointed contestants might 
travel to obtain jurisdiction in a forum that can provide meaningful review 
of disputes arising from federally administered prize contests. In the current 
environment, disappointed contestants may attempt to bring claims in up to 
three different forums before the merits of their claims are reached.39 At best, 
this uncertainty will create unnecessary and inefficient threshold litigation 
30 See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Announces Robocall Challenge Winners 
(Apr. 2, 2013), http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/04/ftc-announces-
robocall-challenge-winners; see also Steve Kelman, Procurement Contests Get Their Due, FCW 
(Jan. 27, 2014, 9:54 AM), http://fcw.com/blogs/lectern/2014/01/challenge.gov-award.aspx.
31 See Complaint at Ex. 6, 2–3, Frankel v. United States, 118 Fed. Cl. 332 (2014) (No. 
13-546).
32 Id. at Ex. 6, 2.
33 See id. at Ex. 6, 3.
34 See David Frankel, B-408319, 2013 CPD ¶ 144, at *1 (Comp. Gen. June 7, 2013); see 
generally 4 C.F.R. § 21.1 (2012) (codifying regulations for filing a GAO protest).
35 Frankel, 2013 CPD ¶ 144, at *2.
36 Complaint at 1, Frankel v. United States, 118 Fed. Cl. 332 (2014) (No. 13-546).
37 Frankel, 118 Fed. Cl. at 336.
38 See, e.g., infra note 118.
39 See infra Part II.
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before the merits of a contest dispute can be resolved. At worst, hiding the 
jurisdictional ball may dissuade future participation in prize contests. The 
government should alleviate the need for this uncertain, expensive, and inef-
ficient litigation by anticipating disputes and preemptively clarifying where 
and how those disputes will be resolved.
Accordingly, Part I of this Article sets the stage, introducing prizes as increas-
ingly popular tools for incentivizing innovative behavior and summarizing the 
nascent, but dramatic proliferation of federally administered prize contests.40 
Part II details at least four potential legal characterizations that contestants 
may be able to use to shoehorn their claims within one of three federal gov-
ernment waivers of sovereign immunity, albeit with uncertain odds.41 Part III 
calls upon Congress and agencies to avoid forcing disappointed contestants 
to litigate over jurisdiction by proactively deciding and disclosing where and 
how prize contest disputes will be resolved.42
I. The Promise of Prize Contests: Panacea or Shiny New 
Object Syndrome?
In an era of constrained resources and gridlocked government,43 the prom-
ise of prize contests shines like a beacon in a storm. The potential of prize 
contests to break through technological barriers appears so compelling that 
40 See infra Part I.
41 See infra Part II.
42 See infra Part III.
43 “Frustration with the current state of American government is widespread . . . . Public 
appraisal of government in general and Congress in particular plumbs new depths. The 
public and the media agree that the current Congress is ‘the worst ever.’” Morris P. Fiorina, 
Gridlock is Bad. The Alternative is Worse, WASH. POST BLOG (Feb. 25, 2014), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/02/25/gridlock-is-bad-the-alternative-
is-worse/. “America has been pretty much stuck in neutral for the past few years, as Repub-
licans used their gains in the 2010 elections to prevent Barack Obama from pushing any of 
the major items on his agenda through Congress.” M.S., Political Gridlock: Intransigence is 
Good Strategy, ECONOMIST BLOG (Mar. 20, 2014, 23:00), http://www.economist.com/blogs/
democracyinamerica/2014/03/political-gridlock.
The 16-day shutdown itself has already led to the biggest plunge in consumer confi-
dence since the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008. . . .
The gridlock also had ripple effects on many industries that rely on the federal govern-
ment in one way or another. . . .
Concerns about the United States as a borrower may have a much longer and deeper 
effect than the shutdown[.]
Annie Lowrey, Nathaniel Popper & Nelson D. Schwartz, Gridlock Has Cost U.S. Billions, 
and the Meter Is Still Running, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2013, at A1, available at http://www.
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President Obama and Congress are actively promoting their use. We hope the 
government fully exploits this initiative’s capacity, but we cannot ignore the 
enormous risks to the private sector associated with the government’s nascent 
prize regime. Unlike many of the more quotidian innovation-incentivizing 
tools available to governments,44 prizes are unique because they involve an ex 
post value transfer; contestants do not receive the prize unless and until they 
win the competition.45
A. Prize Contests: Unique Innovation-Incentivizing Tools
While prizes are not the most widely used or the most familiar method of 
incentivizing innovation, they come from a long, rich, and fascinating tradi-
tion. As the introduction’s anecdotes reveal, governments utilized prizes as 
early as the mid-16th century.46 Yet, more often than prizes, governments use 
patents, research grants, procurement, and tax benefits to incentivize inno-
vation.47 Each of these tools transfers value in return for innovative behavior, 
but each does so in a different way.48
In a prize contest, the contest sponsor offers a predetermined award49 to 
the contestant who successfully solves a problem in satisfaction of specific, 
predetermined criteria.50 Prizes and patents are awarded ex post, while procure-
nytimes.com/2013/10/17/business/economy/high-cost-to-the-economy-from-the-fiscal-
impasse.html?r=0.
44 See LUCIANO KAY, MANAGING INNOVATION PRIZES IN GOVERNMENT 27 (2011); 
MCKINSEY & CO., “AND THE WINNER IS…”: CAPTURING THE PROMISE OF PHILANTHROPIC 
PRIZES 33 (2009).
45 See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 1, at 308; Rourke, supra note 13.
46 The earliest prize contest identified in the KEI Compilation is the 1567 Spanish Lon-
gitude Prize. KEI COMPILATION, supra note 2, at 35. Academic discussion about relative 
benefits of prizes compared to other innovation policies dates back at least to the nineteenth 
century. Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 1, at 305.
47 See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 1, at 311, 319.
48 See generally id. at 315–23 (categorizing the differences between patent, prizes, grants, 
and R&D tax benefits).
49 Not surprisingly, full funding is required before announcing the competition. See 15 
U.S.C. § 3719(m)(2)(3) (2012). Fiscal law experts may be intrigued, however, by the flex-
ibility of funding sources permitted by Congress:
Support for a prize competition . . . , including financial support for the design and 
administration of a prize or funds for a monetary prize purse, may consist of Federal 
appropriated funds and funds provided by the private sector for such cash prizes. [Also, t]he 
. . . agency may accept funds from other Federal agencies to support such competitions.
§ 3719(m)(1) (emphasis added).
50 See KAY, supra note 44, at 10, 14. Prize contests typically utilize incentive prizes, as op-
posed to recognition prizes such as the Nobel and Pulitzer Prizes. Recognition prizes award 
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ment contracts (including R&D contracts), grants, and R&D tax benefits are 
awarded ex ante.51 Except for the difference in the timing of award transfer 
(or payment), prizes are more similar to government contracts than the other 
innovation-incentivizing-methods. Government contract and prize contest 
solicitations articulate specific, typically objective criteria for what their 
participants must accomplish,52 so the Government knows exactly what it is 
paying for.53 In contrast, patents, grants, and tax benefits have more vague 
requirements,54 so it is never clear exactly what, if any, innovation the govern-
ment will incentivize. Comparing prizes with government contracts reveals 
the two benefits and one disadvantage that ex post value transfer creates for 
prize contests.
One signature benefit that prize contests offer derives from the non-
monetary incentives that spur individual participants to invest more in the 
competition than they would devote to traditional government contracts, 
because the theater of the contest plays out in the public eye through the 
entire R&D process.55 The theater associated with the prize contest invokes 
and exploits the prestige of winning, which may serve to attract investors and 
establish recognition for leadership in the field.56 For example, the winner of 
the Goldcorp Challenge reported that, although the value of the prize barely 
past behavior, whereas incentive prizes seek to spur future behavior. Distinguishing between 
recognition prizes and incentive prizes is important, but there are many variations within 
both categories. See MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 44, at 18 (identifying six different types 
of prizes). The America COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2010 (“COMPETES II Act”) 
expressly identifies three types of contests and includes a catch-all provision for new types of 
contest structures. 15 U.S.C. § 3719(c)(1)(4) (2012). Not all prizes are easily characterized, 
for example, see Garvin, supra note 16, at 81.
51 See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 1, at 308; Clayton Stallbaumer, From Longitude to 
Altitude: Inducement Prize Contests as Instruments of Public Policy in Science and Technology, 
2006 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 117, 120–22 (2006).
52 See generally 48 C.F.R. § 14.201-2(b) (requiring specifications for sealed bidding 
procurements to include details of the goods or services needed); § 15.204-2(b) (requiring 
description of goods or services needed for negotiated procurements); 2 C.F.R. § 200.203(c)
(1) (2014) (requiring agencies to provide a “full programmatic description” of all grant op-
portunities prior to accepting applications).
53 See JOHN CIBINIC, JR., RALPH C. NASH, JR. & CHRISTOPHER R. YUKINS, FORMATION 
OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS 502, 527–28 (4th ed. 2011) (describing requirements that 
government contracts must include clear, unambiguous, and complete statements of work 
so that bidders can accurately estimate their costs when bidding); MCKINSEY & CO., supra 
note 44, at 54–56 (describing the importance of clear and objective criteria in prize contests).
54 See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 1, at 328 (recognizing the comparative differences 
between innovation policy devices that provide specific criteria and those that are more broad).
55 See MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 44, at 26.
56 See id.
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covered their expenses, “‘it would have taken [our company] years to get the 
recognition in North America that this [single] project gave us overnight.’”57 
SpaceX, the 2004 winner of the XPrize competition,58 quickly morphed 
from an upstart, relatively unknown rival into a feared maverick, capturing 
a significant market share from the well-established aerospace industry titans. 
NASA’s recent decision to award contracts to both Boeing and SpaceX for the 
development of the Space Taxi program59 offers potent evidence that prize 
contest success is a powerful accelerant to reduce barriers to entry in even the 
most well-defended markets.
In contrast, government contractors are awarded a contract based on their 
proposals, and only then do they attempt to perform the contract, so publicity 
available from competing for the contract, if any, is relatively insignificant 
in comparison.60 In a classic cost-reimbursement R&D contract, once the 
government accepts a proposal and awards the contract, the government is 
obligated to pay for the contractor’s effort, regardless of whether that effort 
proves successful. Contractor and grantee incentives are further diminished 
in comparison when taking into account that the government frequently 
caps profits, and many grants are awarded on a pure cost-reimbursement 
basis, providing no profit at all.61 Moreover, by delaying its prize award until 
57 Id. (alterations in original).
58 See supra note 7.
59 See Andy Pasztor, Boeing and SpaceX NASA Space-Taxi Project, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 
2014, at B3, available at http://online.wsj.com/articles/boeing-and-spacex-share-6-8-billion-
in-nasa-space-taxi-contracts-1410904245; James Dean, Boeing, SpaceX win NASA contracts 
to fly crews, USA TODAY (Sept. 16, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2014/09/16/
nasa-space-station-crew-capsule-announcement/15722729/. In April 2014, SpaceX filed a 
complaint at the COFC alleging, in effect, that the Air Force used a pricing scheme that 
shut SpaceX and other maverick competitors out of the competition for military satellite 
launch contracts against a Lockheed-Boeing joint venture. See Andrew Zajac, Musk’s SpaceX 
Challenges Lockheed-Boeing Monopoly, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 29, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.
com/news/2014-04-28/elon-musk-challenges-lockheed-boeing-rocket-monopoly.html.
60 See CIBINIC, NASH & YUKINS, FORMATION, supra note 53, at 412 (discussing the need 
to affirmatively determine that a contractor is capable of performance prior to award of a 
government contract).
61 See generally 2 C.F.R. § 200.400(g) (2014) (stating as a matter of general policy for cost 
principles in federal grant awards that grantees “may not earn or keep any profit resulting 
from Federal financial assistance, unless expressly authorized by the terms and conditions 
of the Federal award”); 48 C.F.R. § 15.404-4(c)(4)(i) (2013) (citing 10 U.S.C. § 2306(d) 
(2012); 41 U.S.C. § 3905 (2012)) (generally referencing the statutory limit on contractor 
profits in cost reimbursement contracts).
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after the contest criteria are satisfied, the government can spur and sustain 
competition throughout the duration of R&D, production, and testing.62
Non-monetary incentives explain, in part, the seemingly irrational invest-
ment levels that contests generate in relation to their purse size.63 For example, 
$100 million dollars was collectively invested to win the $10 million dollar 
Ansari X-Prize.64 In effect, the contest tips contestants’ cost-benefit scales 
towards making investment decisions that favor society (at least in the view 
of the contest sponsor). Innovators unwilling to sell their ideas to the gov-
ernment for a certain dollar value (here, the prize award), might consider it 
cost-effective to do so once non-monetary values are accounted for.65
A similar and complementary advantage of ex post award is that prize con-
tests tend to “employ” many more contestants than traditional procurements 
(most of which, ultimately, are awarded to a single contractor). Unlike in a 
traditional procurement, 66 there is no need to filter out contestants lacking 
relevant experience or proposing a novel approach.67 Therefore, the prize contest 
shifts risks to the contestants: each contestant assumes the risk that effort (and 
potential failure) will not be compensated.68 Unlike in a traditional govern-
ment R&D contract, where the government pays its contractors throughout 
the process, the government enjoys potential savings or superior return on 
62 The ability of contests to foster the benefits of competition has long been recognized 
by economists:
[T]here is a distinct role for competition—real competition, in the sense the word is 
normally used, not the peculiar static sense in which much of neoclassical economics 
has come to use the term—in situations where there is imperfect information about 
the difficulties associated with different tasks, where it is prohibitively costly to observe 
inputs directly, and where it is difficult to measure the outputs with precision. The 
advantage of competitive systems is that they have greater flexibility and greater adapt-
ability to change the environment than do other forms of compensation.
Nalebuff & Stiglitz, Prizes and Incentives, supra note 25, at 40–41.
63 Alan MacCormack et al., Spurring Innovation Through Competitions, 55 
MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. 25, 26–27 (2013).
64 MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 44, at 25.
65 See id. at 19.
66 CIBINIC, NASH & YUKINS, FORMATION, supra note 53, at 704, 708 (noting that past 
performance evaluation is required and explaining that past performance is used as an evalu-
ation of the risk that a contractor will not be able to perform as promised); JOHN CIBINIC, 
JR., RALPH C. NASH, JR. & JAMES F. NAGLE, ADMINISTRATION OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS 
886 (4th ed. 2006) (discussing the significant time and expense incurred by the Government 
when a contract is terminated due to contractor default).
67 See 2012 OSTP PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 18, at 79; MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 
44, at 23–24; Rourke, supra note 13, at 5.
68 See MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 44, at 25–26.
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investment in a prize contest, where most of the contestants performing R&D 
will not be compensated at all.
The government is well aware of the economic benefits of prize contests, 
which seem particularly attractive in the current environment of sequestration 
and shrinking budgets. In President Obama’s 2011 Strategy for American 
Innovation, he explained that:
[P]rizes have a number of advantages over traditional grants and contracts. Prizes allow 
the sponsor to set an ambitious goal without selecting the team or approach that is 
most likely to succeed, to increase the number and diversity of minds tackling tough 
problems, to pay only for results, and to stimulate private-sector investment that is many 
times greater than the cash value of the prize.69
The White House’s Office of Science and Technology Policy (“OSTP”) 
echoed this sentiment in its 2013 annual review of federal agency imple-
mentation of prizes:
Prizes . . . tap the top talent and best ideas wherever they lie, sourcing breakthroughs 
from a broad pool of both known and unknown sources of innovation in a given in-
dustry. As solutions are delivered prior to payment, the government can benefit from these 
novel approaches without bearing high levels of risk.70
The reach of prize contests outside conventional contracting communities 
adds to the attraction. The ability to include diverse contestants from unre-
lated disciplines, who can introduce novel solutions to traditional problems, 
greatly enhances the likelihood of breaking through seemingly impenetrable 
performance barriers.71 Recent empirical research concludes that breakthrough 
solutions are most likely to come from perspectives outside the scientific 
discipline of the problem at issue.72 Indeed, one study concluded that “[t]he 
further the focal problem was from the solvers’ field of expertise, the more 
likely they were to solve it.”73
69 NAT’L ECON. COUNCIL, COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS & OFFICE OF SCI. & TECH. 
POLICY, A STRATEGY FOR AMERICAN INNOVATION: SECURING OUR ECONOMIC GROWTH AND 
PROSPERITY 12 (2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/Innovation-
Strategy.pdf [hereinafter 2011 STRATEGY FOR AMERICAN INNOVATION] (emphasis added).
70 OFFICE OF SCI. & TECH. POLICY, IMPLEMENTATION OF FEDERAL PRIZE AUTHORITY: 
FISCAL YEAR 2012 PROGRESS REPORT 9 (2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/
files/microsites/ostp/competes_prizesreport_dec-2013.pdf [hereinafter 2013 OSTP PROGRESS 
REPORT] (emphasis added).
71 See supra note 67.
72 See Lars Bo Jeppesen & Karim R. Lakhani, Marginality and Problem-Solving Effective-
ness in Broadcast Search, 21 ORG. SCI. 1016, 1027–30 (2010).
73 Karim R. Lakhani et. al., The Value of Openness in Scientific Problem Solving 9 (Harv. 
Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 07-050, 2007), available at http://www.hbswk.hbs.edu/
item/5612.html.
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History bolsters this theory. John Harrison, who solved the centuries old 
problem of calculating a ship’s longitude at sea, was a self-taught clock-maker, 
not a navigator.74 Napoleon’s 1795 Food Preservation Prize champion, Nicolas 
Appert, who invented the modern practice of canning, was a confectioner.75 
The Mapping Dark Matter Competition provided a more contemporary 
example of this phenomenon, when a glaciology PhD student crafted an 
algorithm—in less than one week—that out-performed state-of-the-art al-
gorithms used by physicists.76
In sum, ex post award deploys a potentially vast number of diverse contes-
tants, while reducing the government’s risk, because it does not have to pay 
for any (or all) contestants’ failure to satisfy the contest requirements.77 The 
benefits of ex post award, however, do not come without cost. Allowing more 
contestants to participate means that for every prizewinner, there are more—
often many more—disappointed contestants. Because the competition plays 
out publicly through the entire R&D process, those disappointed contestants 
have usually invested more in the contests than have disappointed bidders to 
a government contract, who only invest in developing initial proposals prior 
to award. Those disappointed and empty-handed contestants will not always 
walk away quietly. Given the recent explosive growth in federal agency use of 
prize competitions, this danger is particularly pressing. Unfortunately, this 
escalating exposure to private sector investment is not receiving sufficient 
attention.
B. Recent Proliferation of Federally Administered Prize Contests
After the 1927 Orteig Prize—in which Charles Lindbergh completed the 
first non-stop flight from New York to Paris to win the $25,000 purse78—use 
of incentive prize contests temporarily subsided.79 Governments began to rely 
more on the patent system, and private institutions focused on recognition 
prizes like the Nobel and Pulitzer Prizes.80 Prize contests remained dormant 
until the 1990s, when private organizations, most notably the X-Prize 
74 Rourke, supra note 13, at 5.
75 Id.; KEI COMPILATION, supra note 2, at 67. Napoleon sponsored many prizes, and he 
deemed it critical to preserve the food necessary to feed his troops after invading a state that 
was unable or unwilling to provide rations. Appert heated, boiled, and sealed food in airtight 
jars (he used champagne bottles, the strongest readily available source of glass in France), 
largely the same method used today. KEI COMPILATION, supra note 2, at 67.
76 See 2012 OSTP PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 18, at 9.
77 See MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 44, at 19.
78 See KEI COMPILATION, supra note 2, at 12.
79 See id. at 5; MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 44, at 16.
80 See MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 44, at 16.
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Foundation,81 began using contests again and generating impressive results.82 
Some federal agencies with independent statutory authority followed suit.83
Hoping to exploit this trend, President Obama formally encouraged federal 
agencies to use prize contests in his 2009 Strategy for American Innovation.84 
Accordingly, in 2010, the Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”) issued 
a guidance memorandum providing practical and legal advice to agencies using 
prizes.85 That same year, the GSA launched Challenge.gov, a central database 
where agencies can advertise prize contests.86
Up to that point, agencies lacking direct statutory authority to conduct 
prize contests had to navigate carefully and find legal authority to do so.87 That 
changed on January 4, 2011, when President Obama signed the COMPETES 
II Act.88 The Act authorizes all federal agencies to conduct prize contests,89 
without eliminating any of the previous authority agencies may have had for 
doing so.90 As a result, prize activity in federal agencies is booming: in the first 
four months after the GSA launched Challenge.gov, over twenty-five execu-
81 See id. at 16–18.
82 See id. NASA and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (“DARPA”) are 
lauded for their early adoption of prize contests. See 2012 OSTP PROGRESS REPORT, supra 
note 18, at 10–12.
83 See 2012 OSTP PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 18, at 14; see also KAY, supra note 44, at 13.
84 2009 STRATEGY FOR AMERICAN INNOVATION, supra note 18, at 17; 2012 OSTP PROG-
RESS REPORT, supra note 18, at 6.
85 Memorandum from Jeffrey Zients, Deputy Dir. for Mgmt., Office of Mgmt. & Bud-
get, Guidance on the Use of Challenges and Prizes to Promote Open Gov’t (Mar. 8, 2010), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/memoranda_2010/
m10-11.pdf [hereinafter OMB Guidance Memo]; see also 2012 OSTP PROGRESS REPORT, 
supra note 18, at 6.
86 2012 OSTP PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 18; see also KAY, supra note 44, at 8. For a 
general description and assessment of Challenge.gov, see KEVIN DESOUZA, CHALLENGE.GOV: 
USING COMPETITIONS TO SPUR INNOVATION (2012).
87 The OMB Guidance Memo detailed five different potential legal authorizations to 
conduct prize contests, among them: the Necessary Expense doctrine; Other Transactions 
Authority; or grant, procurement, or cooperative agreement authority. See OMB Guidance 
Memo, supra note 85, at 1, 58.
88 The Act adds § 24 to the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980. 15 
U.S.C. § 3719 (2012); see also 2012 OSTP PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 18.
89 15 U.S.C. § 3719(b) (2012).
90 Memorandum from Boris Bershteyn, Gen. Counsel, & Steven VanRoekel, Fed. Chief 
Info. Officer, Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Prize Authority in the America COMPETES 
Reauthorization Act 1, 5 (Sept. 2012), available at https://cio.gov/wp-content/uploads/
downloads/2012/09/Prize_Authority_in_the_America_COMPETES_Reauthorization_Act.
pdf [hereinafter Prize Authority Guidance].
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tive agencies launched sixty competitions.91 By mid-2014, federal agencies 
conducted over 350 competitions,92 and Challenge.gov was the only federal 
winner of the annual Innovations in American Government award.93
The surge of federally administered prize contests opened the door for 
plentiful administrative guidance and academic debate on the relative ben-
efits of prizes compared to other innovation tools and how agencies ought 
to administer their competitions.94 Yet no administrative guidance appears to 
address the issue of where and how prize contest disputes will be resolved.95
II. Space Abhors a Vacuum: The Nascent Prize Regime Begs 
Some Form of Due Process
By design, every prize contest has the potential to produce a vast number 
of disappointed contestants.96 Each disappointed contestant will have invested 
time and money throughout an entire R&D, testing, and evaluation process. 
91 2011 STRATEGY FOR AMERICAN INNOVATION, supra note 69, at 12.
92 See GOLDHAMMER, supra note 22, at 6. Readers should understand that, while growth 
of federally administered prize contest has been explosive, the value of those prizes is merely 
a drop in the bucket when compared to the enormous annual expenditure of contracts or 
grants, which has averaged in excess of $1 trillion per year over the last six fiscal years. See 
Total Federal Spending, USASPENDING.GOV, http://www.usaspending.gov/trends?/trnedstren
dreport=default&viewreport=yes&maj_contracting_agency_t=&pop_cd_t=&vendor_state_
t=&vendor_cd_t_&psc_cat_t&tab=Graph+View&Gox=Go (last visited Aug. 10, 2014). 
Although the GAO recently criticized the accuracy of the data on USASpending.gov, that 
data is constantly being updated, and the website remains the most accessible public source 
of federal spending information. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-476, 
DATA TRANSPARENCY: OVERSIGHT NEEDED TO ADDRESS UNDERREPORTING AND INCONSIS-
TENCIES ON FEDERAL AWARD WEBSITE 18 (2014).
93 Kelman, Procurement Contests Get Their Due, supra note 30.
94 See supra note 1; see also KAY, supra note 44, at 28–29; MacCormack et al., supra note 
63, at 30–32; MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 44, at 35–69; Rourke, supra note 13, at 78; 
Stallbaumer, supra note 51, at 149–58.
95 Despite our focus on oversight and review of contests in this article, we do not mean to 
suggest that this is the only potential concern with this vehicle. “Concerns about prizes are 
that they may inhibit the exchange of information among researchers and innovators due to 
the very nature of competitions, be challenging to design and finance, and result in duplicative 
work which may not be the best use of limited intellectual and financial resources.” Stine, 
Federally Funded Innovation Inducement Prizes, supra note 15 at un-paginated Summary.
96 This article focuses primarily on disputes arising from a contestant’s claimed right to 
“the prize,” as opposed to the myriad of other rights that a contestant could claim during the 
life of a contest. For example, the authors could envision a scenario where the government 
properly awards a prize to a rightful winner, but also finds value (and wishes to exploit the 
ideas) in a number of other contestants’ entries. Those contestants, without defending their 
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Disappointed contestants who feel that the government evaluators failed to 
recognize their genius, improperly assessed their submission, were biased 
against them or their approach, or just generally wronged or even cheated 
them, will want their day in court. Obtaining judicial review of a federally 
sponsored prize contest entails litigation against the U.S. Government,97 
which requires contestants to craft a claim98 that fits within one of the many 
anachronistic and piecemeal waivers of federal sovereign immunity, each of 
which provides a slightly different range of remedies.99 To make matters more 
complicated, there are many different types of prize contests100 deriving from 
multiple legal authorizations.101 Variation among prizes means they will not 
all fit within the same waiver of sovereign immunity, which potentially places 
disappointed contestants from different contests in different forums.
Disappointed contestants may attempt to bring claims in up to three dif-
ferent forums, and even then it remains unclear if they will find a forum with 
jurisdiction to resolve their prize contest dispute on the merits. This stands in 
striking contrast to the way that challenges or protests are handled with regard 
to government contract awards, where every disappointed offeror, provided 
standing and timeliness requirements are satisfied, can bring a claim in any 
right to the actual contest prize, may have a valid claim to compensation arising from the 
Government’s use of their entry.
97 See infra note 106.
98 We use the term “claim” broadly, to include equitable or injunctive relief, and, specifi-
cally, more broadly than the term is used in government contracts disputes. See, e.g., 48 
C.F.R. § 52.233-1(c), citing 41 U.S.C. § 7103: “’Claim’ . . . means a written demand or 
written assertion by one of the contracting parties seeking, as a matter of right, the payment 
of money in a sum certain. . . .”
99 See Vicki C. Jackson, Suing the Federal Government: Sovereignty, Immunity, and Judi-
cial Independence, 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 521, 521 (2003); Steven L. Schooner & 
Erin Siuda-Pfeffer, Post-Katrina Reconstruction Liability: Exposing the Inferior Risk-Bearer, 
43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 287, 289 n.8 (2006). Compare John Copeland Nagle, Waiving Sov-
ereign Immunity in an Age of Clear Statement Rules, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 771, 836775 n.24 
(1995), quoting Roger C. Cramton, Non-Statutory Review of Federal Administrative Action: 
The Need for Statutory Reform of Sovereign Immunity, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, and Parties 
Defendant, 68 MICH. L. REV. 387, 419 (1970) (“No scholar, so far as can be ascertained, 
has had a good word for sovereign immunity for many years.”), and generally criticizing the 
doctrine), and KENNETH CULP DAVIS, 3 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 25.01 (1958) 
(“[N]early every commentator who considers the subject vigorously asserts that the doctrine 
of sovereign immunity must go.”), with Harold J. Krent, Reconceptualizing Sovereign Immu-
nity, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1529, 1561 (1992) (“Despite the disadvantages, however, the need 
to preserve the ability of future generations to fashion policy responsive to contemporary 
majoritarian concerns plausibly justifies immunity.”).
100 See supra note 50.
101 See OMB Guidance Memo, supra note 85, at 5–8.
 THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT BAR JOURNAL VOL. , NO. 
and all of three different adjudicative forums.102 There is not even a clear 
means for disappointed contestants to receive scoring information after the 
prize is awarded: Frankel’s initial request was denied, and he ultimately filed 
a FOIA request for the little information he got, which did not include an 
evaluation of his own submission.103 Compared to sophisticated, negotiated 
government contracts, where unsuccessful offerors are guaranteed informa-
tional “debriefings” within days of the award announcement,104 disappointed 
prize contestants are seemingly deprived of any meaningful feedback despite 
their investment of significant resources and intellectual capital. All of this 
complex, costly, and inefficient threshold litigation and information gather-
ing could be avoided if Congress would definitively state where and how 
prize contest disputes are to be resolved.105 Unless and until Congress does 
so, agencies sponsoring contests should anticipate disputes and proactively 
incorporate dispute resolution clauses into competition rules.
An agency’s decision to award a prize in a federally administered prize 
contests may fit into one of four different legal characterizations depending 
on the authorization used to conduct the prize and the rules of the contest.106 
102 Disappointed offerors contesting the award of a federal procurement contract can elect 
to protest the award at the agency level, at the GAO, and at the Court of Federal Claims. 
There are no administrative exhaustion requirements to prevent a contractor from going 
straight to the GAO or the Court of Federal Claims. See generally 48 C.F.R. §§ 33.103–33.105 
(detailing procedures for protests at the agency level, the GAO, and the COFC).
103 According to Frankel, after the FTC announced the winners, he immediately requested 
the scoring details for his own submission and for the winners. The FTC’s initial response was 
that “feedback and scoring details are not given on high volume challenges[.]” Complaint 
at Ex. 6, 23, Frankel v. United States, 118 Fed. Cl. 332 (2014) (No. 13-546). In response 
to Frankel’s subsequent FOIA request, the FTC provided scoring information on the seven 
finalists (out of over 800 applicants). See id. at 34.
104 See generally 48 C.F.R. §§ 15.505–15.506 (providing detailed guidelines for pre- and 
post-award debriefings given to disappointed offerors in negotiated contracts).
105 See Krent, supra note 99, at 1538–39.
106 These legal characterizations employed to obtain jurisdiction to litigate against the 
federal government are not relevant to prize contests sponsored and administered by private 
organizations. This is critical, because some agencies outsource their contest administration 
to a private organization. In that scenario, we could envision disputes between the contestants 
and the private contractor, at which point sovereign immunity would become irrelevant. 
Privately sponsored prizes, such as any X-Prize, are not within the purview of this analysis. 
Readers may be interested to learn that standard X-Prize contest guidelines do not provide 
a means of appealing the judges’ final decision: “The Judging Panel will have the sole and 
absolute discretion to select the Prize recipients. The decisions of the Judging Panel are 
final, binding, and are not subject to challenge.” Nokia Sensing XChallenge Competition 
Summary, at 8, http://sensing.xprize.org/sites/default/files/nokia_sensing_guidelines-v6.pdf. 
Although, other XPrize contest guidelines are less absolute: “The Judging Panel will review 
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Each characterization potentially allows for some form of review of a prize 
contest dispute in one of three forums. The first of the four characterizations 
is a standard administrative law claim brought in a U.S. District Court seek-
ing an equitable remedy for agency violation of the Administrative Procedure 
Act (“APA”).107 The second and third options involve a common law-based 
breach of contract claim seeking monetary damages at the U.S. Court of 
Federal Claims.108 The fourth characterization is a federal procurement law-
assessments to certify results and to make the final decision regarding the prize award.” 
See Global Learning XPrize Contest Guidelines, at 21, http://learning.stage2.xprize.org/
sites/default/files/global_learning_xprize_proposed_guidelines_v1.pdf. But see the com-
mon approach employed in other types of contests (drawings, photography contests, etc.), 
which offer an arbitral review. See, e.g., LG Lifeband 5K Challenge, http://runkeeper.com/
challenge/termsofservice/lg; Google Photography Prize Official Rules, http://www.google.
com/landing/photographyprize/terms.html; Contest Rules for Great Park Neighborhoods 
Pumpkin Glow Sculpture Contest, http://pumpkinglowgpn.com/sculpture-contest-rules/.
107 Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (codified as amended 
at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59, 701–06 (2012)).
108 The COFC’s jurisdiction to resolve monetary claims for breach of contract comes from 
the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2012). U.S. district courts technically have jurisdiction 
to resolve monetary claims for breach of contract against the government under the aptly 
nicknamed Little Tucker Act, id. § 1346. Because money damages in district court are limited 
to $10,000, id. § 1346(a)(2), contractors rarely find it worth litigating in a federal court. 
Because it fails to offer a meaningful remedy, this article ignores Little Tucker Act jurisdic-
tion. As explained, a contestant could not receive an equitable remedy for an APA violation 
in addition to monetary damages for breach of contract. See infra note 118.
We recognize that the Armed Services and Civilian Boards of Contract Appeals (“ASBCA” 
and “CBCA,” or, collectively, the “BCAs”) also have jurisdiction to resolve government 
contract disputes pursuant to the Contract Disputes Act of 1978 (codified at 41 U.S.C. 
§§ 7102, 7104(a), 7105(e)(1)(A)(B) (2012)). While it is conceivable that a disappointed 
contestant could bring a claim at one of the BCAs, we believe that the strict procedural and 
jurisdictional requirements at the boards make such a claim very unlikely to succeed. Spe-
cifically, we expect that the absence of a contracting officer (“CO”) in prize contests makes 
fulfilling the jurisdictional prerequisites challenging, if not impossible. See § 7105(e)(1)(A)
(B); 48 C.F.R. §§ 1.602, 33.206, 33.210–33.212. Moreover, while the COFC may be willing 
to find that prize contests create a contract, the BCAs, like the GAO, typically prove more 
conventional, and, accordingly, much less inclined to innovate with jurisdictional issues. See, 
e.g., Engage Learning, Inc. v. Salazar, 660 F.3d 1346, 1348, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2011), vacating 
Engage Learning, Inc. v. Dep’t of the Interior, CBCA 1165, 12-1 BCA ¶ 34,960 (finding 
that the CBCA had too narrowly interpreted its own jurisdiction by dismissing plaintiff’s 
CDA claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction where plaintiff alleged, but did not prove, 
the existence of an express or implied-in-fact contract with the government); Michael J. 
Schaengold, T. Michael Guiffré & Elizabeth M. Gill, Choice of Forum for Federal Government 
Contract Bid Protests, 18 FED. CIR. B.J. 243, 275 (2009) (“Although the GAO has broad 
authority to decide bid protests, the GAO has set forth . . . specific examples of protests that 
it will dismiss without consideration.”).
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based bid protest against the award of a procurement contract at either the 
GAO or COFC.109
We address these characterizations or approaches below in an attempt to 
handicap a disappointed contestant’s likelihood of establishing jurisdiction, 
obtaining meaningful review of an agency’s administration of a prize contest, 
and the potential for achieving a meaningful remedy.110 Our sense remains 
that the broadest imaginable judicial review may constitute overkill, providing 
an unnecessarily potent, yet sadly inefficient, dose of due process. We also 
recognize that—absent Congressional or legislative solution—contestants may 
ultimately assert that poorly managed contests involve the unconstitutional 
deprivation of their liberty interests without due process,111 but we hope that 
more pragmatic avenues become available to frustrated contestants.
109 The GAO’s jurisdiction is pursuant to the Competition in Contracting Act (“CICA”). 
31 U.S.C. § 3551 et seq. (1988); CIBINIC, NASH & YUKINS, FORMATION, supra note 53, at 
1688. The COFC’s jurisdiction over disappointed offeror matters (bid protest), as opposed to 
contract disputes, derives from the Tucker Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1) (2012); CIBINIC, 
NASH & YUKINS, FORMATION, supra note 53, at 1763.
110 We concede that we have not yet divined the optimal organizational or analytical rubric 
for presenting this menu. Although it may appear that we began with a hierarchy of fora, our 
aspiration was to prioritize causes of action and their potential efficacy. Ultimately, we fear 
that – absent Congressional or Executive attention to the issue – clarity will evolve slowly, 
through trial and error (and appeal). The end result—driven in large part by unpredictable 
nuances of early movers, such as the pro se Frankel—is unlikely to prove superior to a care-
fully considered legislative or regulatory solution.
111 For example, we could envision an analogy to the “de facto debarment cases,” where 
the Government’s failure to appropriately evaluate a government contractor’s submission 
may constitute a violation of the contractor’s constitutional due process rights. See Old 
Dominion Dairy Products, Inc. v. Secretary of Defense, 631 F.2d 953, 963-64 (D.C. Cir. 
1980) (finding that the Government’s determination that plaintiff lacked integrity and was 
therefore not eligible for award effectively foreclosed plaintiff’s ability to take advantage of 
other government employment opportunities and put plaintiff out of business, amounting 
to an unconstitutional deprivation of plaintiff’s liberty without due process.) While Old 
Dominion is informative, we cannot help but wonder if the D.C. Circuit would have asserted 
jurisdiction if the matter originally presented itself today, given the change in its jurisdic-
tion over bid protests. See infra note 214. Moreover, the extent to which constitutional due 
process is required in any given situation remains notoriously and understandably vague, 
yet we could envision success in any number of imaginable scenarios. See generally Goldberg 
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970) (quoting Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, etc. 
v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)) (“‘consideration of what procedures due process 
may require under any given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the 
precise nature of the government function involved as well as of the private interest that 
has been affected by governmental action’”) (holding that a welfare recipient is entitled to a 
pre-termination evidentiary hearing).
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A. Administrative Law and the Federal District Courts
For many attorneys, the most intuitive way to seek redress for damaging 
agency action is to bring a federal administrative law claim that the agency 
violated the APA.112 Section 702 of the APA broadly waives sovereign immunity 
for claims brought in any U.S. District Court113 by a “person suffering legal 
wrong because of an agency action.”114 The lack of qualifying criteria in the 
APA makes it the most likely of the three characterizations to accommodate 
disappointed contestants from any given prize contest. But, the APA only 
provides compensation “other than money damages,”115 which may not be 
enough to make most disappointed contestants whole.
The APA does not grant any substantive rights; it is only a general waiver 
of sovereign immunity for harms done “within the meaning of a relevant 
statute.”116 Disappointed contestants will have to identify exactly which right 
the agency violated, which will most likely be the statute or regulation that 
provides the agency with legal authorization to conduct the contest. The only 
limitation this poses to the availability of APA review is that the underlying 
112 See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 1, at 27–29 (framing the Longitude Prize dispute in the 
administrative law context and revisiting the historical judgment against the Longitude Board 
as a thought experiment of how the matter might be resolved today).
113 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012).
114 Id. § 702. The growth and evolution of the administrative state led to the creation 
of a broad range of property rights which cannot be deprived without some amount of due 
process. See note 111, supra. “’[T]he new property’ refers to the development of economi-
cally valuable interests that are of vital importance to the holders of those interests, but that 
do not come within the traditional definition of ‘property.’” Charles A. Reich, The New 
Property After 25 Years, 24 U. SAN FRANCISCO L. REV. 223, 225 (1990); Charles A. Reich, 
The New Property, 73 YALE L. J. 733, 787 (1964) (“[I]t is time to reconsider the theories 
under which new forms of wealth are regulated, and by which governmental power over 
them is measured . . . . We cannot safely entrust our livelihood and our rights to the discre-
tion of authorities, examiners, boards of control, character committees, regents, or license 
commissioners.”). We do not suggest an obvious, compelling analogy between prize contests 
academic tenure. Nonetheless, see, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (“allegation 
that the college had a de facto tenure policy, arising from rules and understandings officially 
promulgated and fostered, entitled him to an opportunity of proving the legitimacy of his 
claim to job tenure”); Board of Regents v Roth, 408 US 564 (“The Fourteenth Amendment 
does not require opportunity for a hearing prior to the nonrenewal of a non-tenured state 
teacher’s contract, unless he can show that the nonrenewal deprived him of an interest in 
‘liberty’ or that he had a ‘property’ interest in continued employment, despite the lack of 
tenure or a formal contract.”).
115 See id.
116 See id.
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statute itself may preclude APA review.117 For example, if the agency spe-
cifically conducted its contest pursuant to procurement authority, the APA 
claim would likely be dismissed because U.S. District Courts do not have 
jurisdiction to resolve procurement contract disputes, or, for that matter, any 
breach of contract claim against the government.118 Alternatively, if Congress 
designated a specific forum for prize contest disputes, then that would ef-
fectively eliminate the possibility of APA review in U.S. District Courts.119
Even if there is jurisdiction for APA review, it may not always provide an 
adequate remedy, because only equitable, non-monetary remedies are al-
lowed.120 The APA only provides “other than money damages,”121 which may 
not be enough to make most disappointed contestants whole. Contestants, 
of course, will prioritize potential remedies—money, public recognition, or 
consequential damages (an admittedly unlikely result)—differently. And we 
expect that many disappointed contestants would be satisfied with potential 
non-monetary remedies. In most cases, that equitable remedy will be requiring 
the agency to correct any errors the court finds in the contest administration 
process. But re-evaluating the submissions only helps the rare disappointed 
contestant who would have won but for the agency wrongdoing.
Of course, re-evaluation could lead to ultimate prize award. Still, some 
competitors might perceive a monetary judgment of the prize amount as a 
117 See id.; see also C. Stanley Dees, The Future of the Contract Disputes Act: Is It Time to 
Roll Back Sovereign Immunity?, 28 PUB. CONT. L.J. 545, 550 (1999) (explaining that the 
broad waiver in the first sentence of § 702 is limited by the last sentence of § 702, which says 
no review is available “‘if any other statute that grants consent to suit expressly or impliedly 
forbids the relief which is sought’” (citing 5 U.S.C. § 702)).
118 The APA only waives sovereign immunity for “other than money damages,” and does 
not allow a remedy that is expressly or impliedly forbidden by another statute. 5 U.S.C. 
§ 702; see also Dees, The Future, supra note 117, at 549–50. These two limitations effec-
tively preclude review of a prize contest under the APA if the government can successfully 
characterize that contest as a contract with the government, because the Tucker Act is held 
to impliedly forbid specific performance of a government contract, leaving only money 
damages, which the APA will not allow. See Dees, The Future, supra note 117, at 557 (“[I]t is 
fair to say that specific performance is generally unavailable as a contract remedy.”); Richard 
H. Seamon, Separation of Powers and the Separate Treatment of Contract Claims Against the 
Federal Government for Specific Performance, 43 VILL. L. REV. 155, 157–58 (1998) (noting 
that all but one federal circuit courts recognize that the Tucker Act impliedly forbids specific 
performance of government contracts).
119 See 5 U.S.C. § 703.
120 See § 702.
121 Id.
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hollow victory, to the extent they invested122 more in preparing their submis-
sion than the dollar value of the prize.123 Thus, it is possible that a monetary 
remedy—with the full prize value being awarded—will not make a contestant 
whole, in the conventional sense of expectation damages.124 In any event, 
in order to receive costs of preparing a contest submission, which might, 
in a conventional contract case, be described as either reliance damages or 
incidental damages (or both), 125 disappointed contestants must characterize 
their dispute as the common law breach of an implied-in-fact contract to 
consider submissions fairly or as a bid protest of the improper award of a 
procurement contract.
Whereas the District Courts could only provide prize contestants equitable 
relief, the GAO and COFC would be able to provide bid and proposal costs. 
This is the typical remedy for a breach of contract with the government, and 
the next two sections will demonstrate the different ways that a prize contest 
can be characterized as a contract with the government. A government con-
122 Equitable relief conceivably could entitle a disappointed contestant to remedies that 
result in receiving the full value of the prize. First, the agency could reevaluate the submis-
sions in accordance with the court’s order and determine that the disappointed contestant 
was the rightful winner. Second, and more interestingly, the court could determine that the 
disappointed contestant should have won and order the agency to specifically perform by 
awarding the prize value. Ordering an agency to transfer the dollar-value of the prize might 
appear, on its face, to violate the APA ban on money damages. But Bowen v. Massachusetts, 
487 U.S. 879, 895, 900 (1988), potentially opens the door to this result. See generally 
Gregory C. Sisk, The Tapestry Unravels: Statutory Waivers of Sovereign Immunity and Money 
Claims Against the United States, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 602, 618–27 (2003) (describing 
the Bowen holding and criticizing it for blurring the lines between the Tucker Act and the 
APA); C. Stanley Dees, The Executive Branch as Penelope: Preserving the Tapestry of Sovereign-
Immunity Waivers for Suits Against the United States, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 708, 711–13 
(2003) (acknowledging the potential for the Court’s holding to allow money remedies in 
the case of specific performance, but concluding that providing claimants with quick and 
meaningful remedies is more important than preserving the distinction between Tucker Act 
claims for money damages and APA claims for equitable relief ). For a more recent accounting 
of how lower courts are interpreting Bowen, see S. Jay Plager, Money and Power: Observations 
on the Jurisdiction of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, 17 FED. CIR. B.J. 371, 373–74 (2008) 
(describing recent decisions that could limit the ability of a district court to use the Bowen 
holding to award money damages via specific performance).
123 See MacCormack et al., supra note 63, at 26.
124 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 347, cmt a (1981) (emphasis added) (“Contract 
damages are ordinarily based on the injured party’s expectation interest and are intended 
to give him the benefit of his bargain by awarding him a sum of money that will, to the 
extent possible, put him in as good a position as he would have been had the contract been 
performed.”).
125 Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 347(b), 349.
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tractor would see bid and proposal costs as a significant limitation compared 
to the value of the contract, because the value of the contract is likely to be 
exponentially more valuable that the cost of preparing a proposal for the 
contract. For a prize contestant, however, the cost of creating a submission is 
equal to at least the full value of R&D, and often much more. Of the three 
remaining claims potentially available to prize contestants—breach of express 
contract, breach of implied contract, and the bid protest of a procurement 
contract award—only the express and implied-in-fact contract characterizations 
will allow disappointed contestants, who cannot prove that they should have 
won the contest but for the agency action, to recover the cost of preparing 
their submissions.126
B. Breach of Contract and the U.S. Court of Federal Claims
The second and third potential characterizations of prize contests utilize the 
common law theory of breach of contract. Prize contests can be characterized 
as both express and implied contracts with the government. Pursuant to the 
amended § 1491(a) of the Tucker Act, the COFC today exercises jurisdiction 
to resolve monetary claims against the government arising from, among other 
things, breach of express and implied-in-fact contracts.127 Despite decades 
of experience, however, the COFC has not evolved into the dominant or 
preferred forum for these matters, and our intent here is not to recommend 
this as an exclusive or primary option. Nonetheless, given the natural analogy 
between prizes and contracts and the court’s accumulated experience, it makes 
sense to consider the COFC as a potential home for these matters.128 To be 
126 As explained above, the APA bar to money damages means that the only contestants 
who could benefit from APA review are those that will win the prize if the agency is either 
forced to reevaluate submissions or specifically perform by awarding the prize value directly. 
See supra note 122 and accompanying text. Bid protest jurisdiction requires a protester to 
be prejudiced, that is, that the protester “must demonstrate some probability that it would 
have received the award.” RALPH C. NASH, JR., KAREN R. O’BRIEN-DEBAKEY & STEVEN L. 
SCHOONER, THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS REFERENCE BOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE 
TO THE LANGUAGE OF PROCUREMENT 388 (4th ed. 2007).
127 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2012).
128 For a lively debate as to the effectiveness of the COFC compared to other judicial 
forums, including U.S. District Courts and the GAO (and litigant preferences for alternative 
fora, specifically the GAO and, in disputes, the agency boards of contract appeals), compare 
Steven L. Schooner, The Future: Scrutinizing the Empirical Case for the Court of Federal Claims, 
71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 714, 753–57 figs. 11 & 12 (2003) (graphically demonstrating that, 
over a five-year period, the GAO received more than twenty bid protests for each filing in 
the COFC), with Loren A. Smith, Why a Court of Federal Claims?, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
773, 781–84 (2003); see also infra note 205.
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clear, however, as a threshold matter, the COFC does not have jurisdiction 
to resolve the APA-based claim described in the previous section.129
For disappointed contestants seeking judicial review, so far only the breach 
of express contract claim has provided any degree of success. COFC Judge 
Allegra denied the Department of Justice’s (“DOJ”) motion to dismiss for 
lack of jurisdiction, finding that the FTC Robocall challenge created a con-
tract between Frankel and the government, therefore vesting the COFC with 
jurisdiction pursuant to § 1491(a) of the Tucker Act.130 The court accepted 
Frankel’s view that “the competition constituted a unilateral contract which 
was accepted by plaintiff when he submitted an entry in the competition.”131 
Unlike the GAO, discussed below, Judge Allegra found no difficulty concluding 
that the FTC contest satisfied the familiar offer and acceptance requirements 
of contract formation:132
The offer of a prize for the performance of a specified act in a contest . . . constitutes 
the first part of the normal offer-acceptance consideration equation for the formation 
of an enforceable contract. By competing in the contest, a competit[or] accepts the 
offer; by performing the specified act required for winning the contest, he provides 
the necessary consideration.133
Judge Allegra relied on the Supreme Court’s analysis in Robertson v. United 
States,134 where a composer won a prize for the best unpublished symphonic 
work written by a native-born composer.135 In holding that the prize money 
was taxable as gross income, the Supreme Court opined that “payment of 
a prize to a winner of a contest is the discharge of a contractual obligation. 
The acceptance by the contestants of the offer tendered by the sponsor of the 
contest creates an enforceable contract.”136 Of course, Judge Allegra’s opinion 
does not bind the other COFC judges, who, as a group, have not hesitated 
to sustain divergent lines of precedent within the court.137
In addition to the express contract argument relied on by Judge Allegra, 
prize contests might also be characterized as implied contracts. The breach 
of implied contract claim is based on the premise that, by soliciting and 
129 “It is well-settled that this court does not have jurisdiction to hear cases [challenging 
agency action] under the APA.” Lawrence Battelle, Inc. v. United States, 117 Fed. Cl. 579, 585 
(2014) (citing Martinez v. United States, 333 F.3d 1295, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (en banc)).
130 See Frankel v. United States, 118 Fed. Cl. 332, 335–36 (2014).
131 Id. at 335.
132 See id. at 336.
133 Id. at 335 (quoting Lucas v. United States, 25 Cl. Ct. 298, 304 (1992) (quoting Nat’l 
Amateur Bowlers, Inc. v. Tassos, 715 F. Supp. 323, 325 (D. Kan. 1989))).
134 343 U.S. 711 (1952).
135 Id. at 711–12.
136 Id. at 713.
137 See infra note 165.
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receiving contestants’ submissions, the government enters into an implied 
contract to review those submissions fairly.138 If such an implied contract is 
found to exist, the COFC will review the agency’s evaluation of submission 
for arbitrary and capricious action.139 To prove the existence of an implied-in-
fact contract, disappointed contestants must evidence mutual assent through 
offer and acceptance, consideration, and enough definiteness for the agree-
ment to be enforced.140
The premise is that the agency makes an offer to all eligible contestants by 
advertising the contest and publishing its rules in the Federal Register.141 The 
offer is not to enter a bilateral contract by providing a promise to perform; 
instead, the advertisement impliedly offers a unilateral contract, where the 
agency agrees to evaluate submissions fairly in return for the contestants’ 
performance.142 In this context, performance means investing time and effort 
into creating and entering an eligible, but not necessarily winning, submis-
sion. The offer is accepted, and the contract simultaneously formed, as soon 
as the contestant adequately performs by submitting an eligible entry to the 
agency. If the agency’s offer stipulates any specifications for how acceptance 
138 “[I]t is an implied condition of every request for offers that each of them will be fairly 
and honestly considered.” Cont’l Bus. Enters., Inc. v. U.S., 452 F.2d 1016, 1019 (Ct. Cl. 
1971). “This implied-in-fact contract between the government and bidders on the underlying 
contract requires the government to fully and fairly consider all bids submitted in accordance 
with the invitation for bids.” Hawpe Const., Inc. v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 571, 577–78 
(2000), aff’d, 10 F. App’x 957 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
139 See Hawpe, 46 Fed. Cl. at 578.
140 See City of El Centro v. United States, 922 F.2d 816, 820 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“An implied-
in-fact contract requires findings of: 1) mutuality of intent to contract; 2) consideration; 
and, 3) lack of ambiguity in offer and acceptance.”). When the United States is a party to 
the contract, there is a fourth requirement that the government representative had actual 
authority to bind the government in the contract. Id.
141 See 15 U.S.C. § 3719(e)–(f ) (2012). The COMPETES II Act requires not only that 
“[t]he head of an agency shall widely advertise each prize competition to encourage broad 
participation[,]” but also that specific information be published in the Federal Register, in-
cluding “(1) the subject of the competition; (2) the rules for being eligible to participate . . . ; 
(3) the process for participants to register . . . ; (4) the amount of the prize; and (5) the basis 
on which a winner will be selected.” Id.
142 See Roberson v. United States, 115 Fed. Cl. 234, 242 (2014). “Consideration may 
consist of a performance or of a return promise. Consideration by way of performance may 
be a specified act of forbearance, or any one of several specified acts or forbearances of which 
the offeree is given the choice, or such conduct as will produce a specified result.” RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 cmt. d (1981).
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must be made, then no contract is formed unless submissions fully comply 
with those instructions.143
Most prize contests provide both parties with consideration and are suf-
ficiently definite to be enforced. The consideration the agency receives is the 
contestants’ participation in the contest, a potential solution to the problem 
the contest is intended to solve, and any intellectual property rights trans-
ferred by submission. The consideration for the contestant is the opportunity 
to participate in the contest and potentially win the prize.144 The contract 
is definite enough to be enforced145 as long as the rules state how submis-
sions must be received in order to be eligible, how the agency will evaluate 
proposals, and the value of the prize.146 The agency breaches the contract by 
treating compliant submissions in a way that is arbitrary and capricious, an 
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law or the publicly 
promulgated contest rules.147
Jurisdiction to bring a breach of contract claim against the Government 
evaporates if there is no contract. The DOJ, which vigorously defends against 
all jurisdictional incursions against the government’s sovereign immunity, will 
almost certainly argue that entering a prize submission is not adequate to bind 
143 “If an offer prescribes the place, time or manner of acceptance its terms in this respect 
must be complied with in order to create a contract.” § 60. For example, the COFC recently 
dismissed a challenge to a prize contest for lack of jurisdiction after finding that no contract 
was formed because the contest rules required submissions be made electronically, but the 
disappointed contestant only sent a hard copy. See Roberson, 115 Fed. Cl. at 242. Roberson 
does not suggest that the court lacks jurisdiction over any prize contest dispute. On the one 
hand, suing for breach of implied contract requires fairly sophisticated legal arguments, 
which the Plaintiff in Roberson, proceeding pro se from Georgia state prison, may not fully 
have understood. See id. at 237–38, 240. More importantly, Roberson reminds contestants 
that they cannot form an implied contract of fair consideration with the government unless 
they fully comply with contest rules. See id. at 242.
144 See Frankel v. United States, 118 Fed. Cl. 332, 335 (2014) (citing 7 WILLISTON ON 
CONTRACTS § 16:6 (4th ed. 2014)). Of course, in its classical form, consideration entailed 
a benefit to the promisor or a detriment to the promisee, whereas the modern form simply 
requires a bargained-for exchange. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71(1) cmt. a 
(1981).
145 “[A]n offer . . . cannot be accepted so as to form a contract unless the terms of the 
contract are reasonably certain. . . . The terms of a contract are reasonably certain if they 
provide a basis for determining the existence of a breach and for giving an appropriate rem-
edy.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33 (1981).
146 Contests conducted pursuant to the COMPETES II Act will meet these requirements. 
See supra note 141.
147 “To establish that the government breached its implied-in-fact contract, the plaintiff 
must show that the government’s behavior was arbitrary and capricious.” Crux Computer 
Corp. v. United States, 24 Cl. Ct. 223, 225 (1991).
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the Government to an implied contract to fairly consider that submission.148 
In Motorola, Inc. v. United States149 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit (“Federal Circuit”) raised the standard for forming an implied contract 
of fair consideration, stipulating that the government is only bound when 
it solicits and receives information that is binding on the submitting party, 
as opposed to non-binding responses to, for example, government Requests 
For Information (“RFI”).150
Most, if not all, prize contests satisfy the Motorola standard for forming an 
implied contract of fair consideration. In fact, most prize submissions provide 
the government even more substance than a formal bid, which entails merely a 
148 “[T]he Department of Justice . . . aggressively advocat[es] the doctrine of sovereign im-
munity to deny rights and remedies to contractors.” Dees, The Future, supra note 117, at 556.
149 988 F.2d 113 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
150 See id. at 116. The court opined:
The court cannot go along with the contention that Motorola’s responses to Govern-
ment requests for information gave rise to an implied contract. . . .
Government requests for information and responses from prospective bidders are not 
the equivalents of offer and acceptance. Such exchanges are not carried on with an 
expectation to presently affect legal relations.
Id. at 115–16.
Instead of interpreting the affirmed COFC opinion in Motorola as a strict requirement 
that a formal bid is required to create an implied-in-fact contract of fair consideration, the 
opinion is better understood as only overturning the holdings in Magnavox Electronic Systems 
Co. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 1373, 1377–78 (1992), and Standard Manufacturing Co. v. 
United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 54, 59 (1984), which bound the government to an implied contract 
after receiving only non-binding responses to RFI. See Commc’n Constr. Servs., Inc. v. 
United States, 116 Fed. Cl. 233, 260 n.13 (2014). The court explained:
[Plaintiff] misconstrues Motorola to establish a general principle that submission of 
a proposal is always required to establish the implied-in-fact contract necessary for § 
1491(a) pre-award protest jurisdiction. While the trial court . . . did articulate that 
principle, the Federal Circuit, using limiting language in its affirmance, did not adopt 
the trial court’s reasoning wholesale.
Id. In Motorola, the COFC distinguished an RFI response (merely the submission of infor-
mation) from a bid; submission of a bid empowers the government to accept the offer and 
bind the offeror to the terms in the bid. 988 F.2d at 116.
Even if the COFC intended to restrict the formation of implied contracts of fair con-
sideration to situations where formal bids are submitted, the Federal Circuit did not affirm 
it in that respect, and has since refused to do so. The Federal Circuit stated that no implied 
contract was formed because Motorola had neither submitted a formal bid nor “otherwise met 
its burden to show that an implied contract existed” and affirmed the COFC opinion only “to 
the extent consistent with the above.” Id. at 114 (emphasis added); see also Commc’n Constr. 
Servs., 116 Fed. Cl. at 260. The Federal Circuit again declined to hold that only a formal bid 
creates an implied contract of fair consideration in Emery Worldwide Airlines, Inc. v. United 
States, 264 F.3d 1071, 1084 n.12 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
EYES ON THE PRIZE, HEAD IN THE SAND 
binding promise to perform, because the contestant’s participation, submission, 
and transfer of intellectual property rights constitutes actual performance. 
The agency not only receives the actual submission, which could solve the 
problem deemed worthy of a contest, but also the intangible benefit of each 
contestant’s participation in the contest. Every contestant that participates 
increases publicity and the competitiveness of the contests, drawing attention 
to contestants and encouraging them to invest more in their performance. 
But for the anticipated effort and participation of contestants that eventu-
ally lose, the prizewinner might not be sufficiently incentivized to invest in 
creating the winning solution.151
In contrast to APA claims and bid protests which allow equitable relief, 
the COFC can only provide monetary damages to remedy the government’s 
breach of contract, regardless of whether that contract is express or implied.152 
In most cases, damages are equal to the cost of preparing the information or 
proposal submitted.153 In the context of a prize contest dispute, damages would 
likely amount to the cost of preparing the contest entry. A major advantage 
of bringing a breach of contract claim under the Tucker Act, as opposed to 
bringing an APA claim or a procurement bid protest, is that the Tucker Act 
contains no requirement that contestants prove that they would have won 
but for the agency wrongdoing.154 Instead, disappointed contestants need 
only show that the agency breached its contract by not following the rules set 
out in the contest guidelines, or breached its implied contract by evaluating 
submissions arbitrarily and capriciously.155
The breach of contract claims, however, will only provide monetary damages, 
not equitable relief. If a disappointed contestant seeks an equitable remedy and 
the costs of preparing a submission, then it will have to successfully characterize 
its dispute as a bid protest of the improper award of a procurement contract. 
Procurement contract bid protest jurisdiction appears far narrower than the 
APA and Tucker Act claims discussed above; therefore, fewer prizes are likely 
to fit within this last potential characterization. While both equitable and 
money-damages are available in a bid protest, only prejudiced disappointed 
151 See supra Part I.A. (discussing the importance of contestants’ participation for the 
success of the contest enterprise).
152 See Massie v. United States, 226 F.3d 1318, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2000); FAS Support Servs., 
LLC v. United States, 93 Fed. Cl. 687, 694 (2010).
153 “A breach of the contract will generally entail return of bid preparation or proposal 
costs.” Crux Computer Corp. v. United States, 24 Cl. Ct. 223, 225 (1991).
154 See supra note 126.
155 See supra note 147.
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contestants who can show they probably would have won but for the agency 
wrongdoing are entitled to review.156
C. Procurement Contract Bid Protest: The Quasi-Judicial Option
Compared to the APA and contract claims, bid protests are probably the 
least familiar to most attorneys outside the government contracts bar. The 
GAO and COFC exercise different statutory authority to resolve bid protests,157 
employ different procedural rules,158 and generate their own independent lines 
of precedent;159 but the basic substantive legal requirement for obtaining bid 
protest jurisdiction is fundamentally the same: the protest must arise from 
the formation of a contract with a federal agency160 for the procurement of 
property or services.161
The GAO dismissed David Frankel’s protest against the FTC’s Robocall 
Challenge for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the competition did not cre-
ate a contract.162 COFC Judge Allegra granted the DOJ’s motion to dismiss 
Frankel’s bid protest claim, finding that, although the FTC Challenge created 
a contract, that contract was not in connection with a procurement.163 The 
GAO and COFC opinions offer case studies to show how future contest dis-
putes may be analyzed. Due to the variation in statutory authority and rules 
among different prize contests, neither the GAO nor the COFC opinions in 
Frankel’s dispute preclude future litigation over these forums’ jurisdiction to 
resolve other prize contest disputes. This is particularly true at the COFC, 
156 See supra note 126.
157 See supra note 109.
158 GAO protests at the GAO are governed by 4 C.F.R. § 21 (2012). See also 48 C.F.R. 
§ 33.104. COFC protests are governed by Rules of Court of Federal Claims. § 33.105.
159 COFC and GAO precedent do not bind the other forum. CIBINIC, NASH & YUKINS, 
FORMATION, supra note 53, at 1802. The GAO follows its own precedent, while the Federal 
Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court bind the COFC. Id. at 1807–08. The COFC can 
overturn a decision made by GAO, but the GAO will not hear a case that has been decided 
by, or is currently pending at, another court of competent jurisdiction. Id. at 1804, 1806.
160 Both the GAO and COFC bid protest jurisdiction are limited to procurements by 
federal agencies as defined by 40 U.S.C. § 472, which basically includes all federal executive 
agencies that operate with appropriated funds. See id. at 1688, 1763–64.
161 See id. at 1688, 1765.
162 See David Frankel, B-408319, 2013 CPD ¶ 144, at *3 (Comp. Gen. June 7, 2013).
163 Frankel v. United States, 118 Fed. Cl. 332, 337 (2014),
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where cases are randomly assigned to one of sixteen judges,164 and those judges 
frequently disagree with each other as to matters of law.165
The GAO and COFC have concurrent jurisdiction to resolve bid protests 
arising from the formation of procurement contracts166 with federal agencies.167 
In dismissing Frankel’s protest for lack of an underlying contract, the GAO 
focused only on the first sentence of the definition of “contract,”168 which 
requires “a mutually binding legal relationship obligating the seller to furnish 
the supplies or services . . . and the buyer to pay for them.”169 The Robocall 
Challenge rules stipulated that by submitting proposals contestants would 
retain all intellectual property but give the government a limited license to 
use the proprietary information for three years.170 Despite the $50,000 prize 
value and the non-monetary value of participating in the contest, the GAO 
determined that contestants participated without any expectation of remu-
neration.171 Despite the three-year license to use proprietary information in 
submissions, the GAO concluded that the contest rules gave the agency no 
enforceable right to obtain anything.172 According to the GAO, no contract 
was formed because there was no duty for the sellers (contestants) to furnish 
anything and no duty for the buyer (the agency) to pay.173
164 See FED. CL. R. 40.1(a); CIBINIC, NASH & NAGLE, ADMINISTRATION, supra note 66, 
at 1324.
165 CIBINIC, NASH & NAGLE, ADMINISTRATION, supra note 66, at 1324. “[T]here is . . . a 
lack of uniformity among the judges of the COFC themselves because, under their rules, 
unlike the judges on the Court of Appeals, judges are not bound by their own precedents or 
by each other’s decisions.” The Honorable S. Jay Plager, Abolish the Court of Federal Claims? 
A Question of Democratic Principle, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 791, 794 (2003). “[W]e share 
the frustration of those who complain that, all too often, the luck of the draw at the Court 
of Federal Claims significantly affects a case’s outcome.” Steven L. Schooner, Postscript III: 
Challenging an Override of a Protest Stay, 26 NASH & CIBINIC REP. ¶ 25 (2012).
166 FAR 2.101 defines “contract” as:
[A] mutually binding legal relationship obligating the seller to furnish the supplies or 
services (including construction) and the buyer to pay for them. It includes all types of 
commitments that obligate the Government to an expenditure of appropriated funds . . . . 
In addition to bilateral instruments, contracts include . . . orders, . . . under which the 
contract becomes effective by written acceptance or performance.
48 C.F.R. § 2.101 (emphasis added).
167 See supra note 109.
168 See David Frankel, B-408319, 2013 CPD ¶ 144, at *2 (Comp. Gen. June 7, 2013); 
Ralph C. Nash, Dateline August 2013, 27 NASH & CIBINIC REP. ¶ 113 (2013).
169 48 C.F.R. § 2.101.
170 Frankel, 2013 CPD ¶ 144, at *2–3.
171 See id. at *3; supra note 30.
172 Frankel, 2013 CPD ¶ 144, at *3.
173 See id.
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Emeritus Professor Ralph C. Nash, Jr. immediately recognized that GAO 
overlooked the second sentence of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (“FAR”) 
definition of “contract,”174 which broadly includes “all types of commitments 
that obligate the Government to an expenditure of appropriated funds.”175 
The Robocall Challenge was administered under the COMPETES II Act, 
which requires prize money to be properly appropriated and that the prize 
obligated the FTC to expend $50,000 to the winner of the contest. Therefore, 
as Nash points out, it seems that a contract was formed within the definition 
of FAR 2.101.176
As a matter of basic contract law principles, it is difficult to deny that the 
Robocall Challenge and similarly structured contests are contracts, albeit 
unilateral contracts. The Second Restatement of Contracts explicitly suggests 
that contests are a type of contract:
An offer may create separate powers of acceptance in an unlimited number of per-
sons . . . . Where one acceptor only is to be selected, various methods of selection are 
possible: for example, “first come, first served” . . . , the highest bidder . . . , or the 
winner of a contest.177
Contestants invest time and money into creating a submission, participate 
publicly in the theater of the contest, and often give the government rights 
to their intellectual property.178 The contestants labor not for nothing, as the 
GAO seems to suggest, but in consideration of the non-monetary benefits of 
participating and the opportunity to win the value of the prize. The agency 
creates an offer upon publishing an advertisement of the contest and its rules, 
and the contestant accepts by entering an eligible submission in accordance 
with any procedural requirements in the offer. This type of unilateral contract 
does not resemble a typical bid protest scenario arising out of the formation of 
bilateral government contracts. But FAR 2.101 expressly includes unilateral 
contracts within its scope: “[i]n addition to bilateral instruments, contracts 
include . . . orders, . . . under which the contract becomes effective by written 
acceptance or performance.”179
As detailed in the previous section, COFC Judge Allegra had no difficulty 
finding that the Robocall challenge created an enforceable contract. Even 
so, finding a contract is only half the battle; indeed, Judge Allegra dismissed 
Frankel’s bid protest after concluding that the contract created by the FTC 
174 See Nash, Dateline August 2013, supra note 168.
175 48 C.F.R. § 2.101.
176 See Nash, Dateline August 2013, supra note 168.
177 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 29 cmt. b (1981) (emphasis added).
178 See KAY, supra note 44, at 20–21.
179 48 C.F.R § 2.101.
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Challenge was not conducted in connection with a procurement.180 Unfor-
tunately, the court provided little by way of explanation for its conclusion:
But is plaintiff entitled to the injunctive relief he seeks under the bid protest provisions 
of 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(2)? The court thinks not.
Section 1491(b)(1) provides, in pertinent part, that an “interested party [may object] 
to a solicitation . . . for bids or proposals for a proposed contract” or to “any alleged 
violation of statute or regulation in connection with a procurement or proposed procure-
ment.” (Emphasis added). The Federal Circuit has construed the bolded phrase to 
“signify the act of obtaining or acquiring something, in the context of acquiring goods 
or services.” . . . In Resource Conservation Group, the Federal Circuit, after reviewing 
the legislative history of the statute in question, rejected the argument that section 
1491(b)(1) grants this court protest jurisdiction over non-procurement disputes (there 
a dispute over a lease of government property). . . . Consistent with these rulings, in 
Lucas, 25 Cl. Ct. at 307, which also involved a contest, this court opined “compet-
ing in a contest and winning the same may well serve to create a contract, but such a 
contract does not constitute [a] procurement.”
Based upon these cases, the court finds that the Contest in question was not a “pro-
curement” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1) and thus that plaintiff is 
unable to obtain the injunctive relief that is available under 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(2).181
180 Frankel v. United States, 118 Fed. Cl. 332, 336–37 (2014).
181 Id. (alterations in original) (internal citations omitted). Lucas v. United States, 25 
Cl. Ct. 298 (1992), on which the court relies both to find that a contract was formed in the 
FTC Robocall Contest, as well as to conclude that the contract was not in connection with 
a procurement, is not as compelling of an authority when considered with context. Indeed, 
Lucas is really not a prize contest dispute at all, as the plaintiff won the prize and received the 
full award, but then disputed the agency’s compliance with an alleged additional contractual 
obligation. In this sense, Lucas is a garden-variety breach of contract claim. Lucas concerned a 
dispute arising out of a contest to design a Korean War memorial on the National Mall. Id. at 
300. The plaintiff won the contest and the sponsoring agency paid the full prize value. Id. at 
304. The breach of contract claim concerned whether the contest created a further contractual 
obligation for the agency to eventually build the memorial according to plaintiff’s winning 
design—plaintiff alleged that the agency changed the design so much that it constituted a 
breach of the unilateral contract created by the contest guidelines. Id. at 304–05. The language 
quoted in Frankel, stating that a contest creates a contract, but not a procurement, is made 
in the context of dismissing the agency’s argument that the Claims Court lacked jurisdiction 
because the prize contest fell within the Court’s Contract Disputes Act jurisdiction. Id. at 
307. Moreover, in Lucas, the government conceded liability on breach of contract and moved 
for summary judgment for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted due 
to lack of damages, because the plaintiff already had received the full prize value and only 
claimed damages associated with not having its design turned into a memorial. The court 
never actually held that a contract was formed, nor did it affirmatively designate whether 
or why it had jurisdiction over the claim; instead, the court granted defendant’s motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted. Id. at 309–10, 312.
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Even if prize contests create a contract within the definition of FAR 2.101, 
the GAO and COFC will lack jurisdiction unless the transaction involves a 
contract for the procurement of property or services.182 In other words, in order 
for a disappointed contestant to successfully use a bid protest to obtain judicial 
review, the prize must be susceptible to being characterized as a procurement. 
“Procurement”183 refers to “the acquiring by contract with appropriated funds 
of supplies or services (including construction) by and for the use of the Federal 
Government through purchase or lease.”184 Judge Allegra’s opinion denying 
Frankel bid protest jurisdiction offered limited analysis regarding why the 
FTC Challenge was not a procurement of either property or services, and 
Frankel, acting pro se, was ill-suited to craft precedent-making analysis. We 
think a more sophisticated litigant might more effectively press the point.
Two arguments suggest that prize contests are procurements for property 
or services. One depends upon contestants’ submissions giving the govern-
ment rights to the contestants’ intellectual property. If the agency obtains a 
full ownership interest in the intellectual property submitted,185 that appears 
comparable to a routine procurement of intellectual property.186 Even if the 
government obtains only a lease to use that proprietary information in return 
for the opportunity to win the prize value,187 such a lease of intellectual property 
182 See CIBINIC, NASH & YUKINS, FORMATION, supra note 53, at 1691, 1763. The GAO’s 
jurisdiction is limited strictly to contracting actions for the “procurement of property or 
services.” 31 U.S.C. § 3551 (1988). The COFC has slightly broader jurisdiction over all 
protests “in connection with procurement.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b) (2012).
183 In many contexts, procurement, acquisition, and contracting mean the same thing, 
referring to the Government’s purchasing powers and practices. Although the term procure-
ment is used in articulating the bid protest jurisdiction at both the GAO and COFC, see 
supra note 182, the FAR defines procurement by reference to the definition of acquisition. 
48 C.F.R § 2.101 (defining “[p]rocurement” as “see ‘acquisition’”).
184 48 C.F.R § 2.101.
185 The COMPETES II Act prohibits the government from obtaining an interest in in-
tellectual property rights developed by a contest participant without written consent of the 
contestant. The government may negotiate a license for the use of participants’ intellectual 
property. 15 U.S.C. § 3719(j)(1) (2012).
186 Government acquisition of intellectual property is regularly treated as procurement of 
property. See generally RALPH C. NASH, JR. & LEONARD RAWICZ, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN 
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS 825–26 (6th ed. 2008) (explaining the complexities of govern-
ment “procurement of technical information” and introducing the applicable procurement 
regulations).
187 The COMPETES II Act authorizes the government to negotiate a license for the use 
of participants’ intellectual property. 15 U.S.C. § 3719(j)(2).
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appears to fall within the umbrella of a procurement for property,188 because 
the definition of procurement encompasses leases:189 both the GAO and the 
COFC hold that the lease of real property is a procurement of property, subject 
to bid protest jurisdiction.190 If the government takes no interest in the intel-
lectual property, however, the contest seems analogous to an RFI or general 
market research, where the government seeks information without making 
any enforceable obligation to provide compensation for information received.
In the alternative, it seems reasonable to conclude that a prize contest is 
a form of contract in which the agency procures the service of laboring to 
create a submission for the agency to consider in furtherance of its statutory 
missions. The agency not only receives the actual submission, which may very 
well solve the problem deemed worthy of the contest, but also the intangible 
benefit of each contestant’s participation in the contest. A contest that re-
quires public displays, testing, and competition—such as the DARPA Grand 
Challenges, where teams developed automated vehicles and then gathered to 
race their submissions191—certainly “directly engages the time and effort” of 
a contestant “whose primary purpose is to perform an identifiable task,” in 
satisfaction of the FAR’s definition of service.192
Whether or not any given contest can be characterized as a procurement 
contract depends on the legal authorization used to conduct the contest. Just 
as a contest conducted pursuant to procurement authority is precluded from 
APA review,193 other forms of authorization might preclude review of the prize 
under procurement law. For example, if a prize contest is conducted pursuant 
188 Professor Nash expressed his agreement with this conclusion. Email from Ralph C. 
Nash to author (Feb. 13, 2014) (on file with authors).
189 See 48 C.F.R. § 2.101 at 21, 33 (“Procurement”; “Acquisition”).
190 See Forman v. United States, 767 F.2d 875, 878–79 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (explaining 
that acquiring an existing leasehold in real property is not an acquisition, but that entering 
into a new lease of real property is); Roth-Radcliffe Co., B-213872, 84-1 CPD ¶ 589, at 
*1 (Comp. Gen. June 1, 1984) (discussing agency decision to solicit proposals for lease of 
real property); see also Nash, Dateline August 2013, supra note 168 (“GAO has taken protest 
jurisdiction over leases of real property in numerous cases.”).
191 See KEI COMPILATION, supra note 2, at 35; Sebastian Thrun et al., Stanley: The Robot 
that Won the DARPA Grand Challenge, 23 J. OF FIELD ROBOTICS 661, 662–63 (2006).
192 The FAR defines service contract as “a contract that directly engages the time and 
effort of a contractor whose primary purpose is to perform an identifiable task rather than 
to furnish an end item of supply.” CIBINIC, NASH & YUKINS, FORMATION, supra note 53, at 
6 (citing 48 C.F.R. § 37.101).
193 See supra note 118.
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to an agency’s authority to award grants, that may preclude obtaining review 
through a bid protest because grants are, by definition, not procurements.194
For disappointed contestants, the primary benefit of characterizing prize 
award disputes as a bid protest is that equitable remedies (e.g., an injunction) 
and limited monetary remedies (the costs of preparing a contest submission 
and, far less frequently, attorney’s fees) are available.195 Unlike the breach of 
contract characterizations under the Tucker Act, which could provide all 
disappointed contestants with submission preparation costs, both the GAO 
and COFC have a jurisdictional requirement of prejudice, meaning disap-
pointed contestants must show that but for the agency wrongdoing they 
probably would have won.196
Although bid protests at the GAO and COFC provide the most helpful 
remedies, they are also the most limited of the four potential jurisdictional 
grants that prize contests may fall into. Even if a particular prize contest can 
be accurately characterized as a contract with a federal agency for the procure-
ment of property or services, actually making that characterization requires 
fairly sophisticated legal arguments. Implied contract and APA-based claims 
are considerably broader, but neither guarantees a complete remedy. Further, 
because COFC and U.S. District Court judges from different districts are 
not bound to defer to each other’s decisions, there is no way to predict how 
each contest dispute in those forums will be handled. Instead of leaving 
disappointed contestants on their own to wade through this jurisdictional 
uncertainty, the government should definitively state where and how prize 
contest disputes are to be resolved.
194 See 48 C.F.R § 2.101 (“Contracts do not include grants and cooperative agreements 
covered by 31 U.S.C. §§ 6301 et seq.”).
195 CIBINIC, NASH & YUKINS, FORMATION, supra note 53, at 1741–44, 1746, 1755, 1791–94. 
GAO is empowered to award the disappointed offeror’s bid and proposal preparation costs 
and, in certain circumstances, the costs of bringing a protest, including limited attorney’s 
(and expert and consultant) fees. 4 C.F.R. § 21.8(d)(1), (d)(2) (2012). The COFC may only 
award attorney’s fees to small business protestors, pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act 
(“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (2012); see also CIBINIC, NASH & YUKINS, FORMATION, supra 
note 53, at 1797. It is conceivable that an executive agency administrative tribunal, analogous 
to the agency boards of contract appeals, might also be empowered to award attorney’s fees 
to small business contestants pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 504. See 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(A)–(B) 
(2012). Of course, individual entrepreneurs and researchers would typically qualify as small 
businesses. See generally 48 C.F.R. § 19.102 (2013); 13 C.F.R. §§ 121 et seq. (2014). The 
U.S. Small Business Administration (“SBA”) establishes small business size standards by 
industry, organized by North American Industry Classification System (“NAICS”) codes. 
Table of Small Business Size Standards, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., http://www.sba.gov/content/
table-small-business-size-standards (last visited Jan. 17, 2015).
196 CIBINIC, NASH & YUKINS, FORMATION, supra note 53, at 1735, 1787; see supra note 126.
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III. Supplementing Administrative Efficiency with 
Accountability and Transparency: Contest Sponsors Should 
Anticipate Prize Disputes and Provide Appropriate Due 
Process
Prizes come in so many variations that finding a forum with jurisdic-
tion over the disputes they create is more likely to generate nonproductive 
jurisdictional litigation than to provide meaningful relief or any significant 
semblance of review.197 Little value is derived from the delays experienced, and 
the massive expenditures borne, by early claimants’ attempts to determine 
where to litigate.198 “Nothing is more wasteful than litigation about where 
197 Protesters who fail to obtain relief from the GAO may subsequently bring the same 
claim at the COFC; the GAO decision is not binding, but it is included in the record. See 
CIBINIC, NASH & YUKINS, FORMATION, supra note 53, at 1802, 1804. Conversely, GAO 
will not hear a case after the COFC has ruled on it, and the GAO will dismiss any claim 
that has also been brought in another court of competent jurisdiction. Id. at 1802. It is 
possible to bring certain (non-protest) claims at the COFC and then a U.S. District Court, 
but plaintiffs must be careful to file at the COFC first. 28 U.S.C. § 1500 (2012); see Emily 
S. Bremer & Jonathan R. Siegel, Clearing the Path to Justice: The Need to Reform 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1500, 65 ALA. L. REV. 1, 4 (2013).
198 The Spent Nuclear Fuel (“SNF”) cases offer a glaring example of the costs of Congress 
and agencies establishing a meaningful program, but not preemptively establishing how dis-
putes arising from that program will be resolved. After Congress passed the Nuclear Waste 
Policy Act of 1982, the Department of Energy (“DOE”) made agreements for private nuclear 
facilities to temporarily store SNF with the understanding that DOE would eventually step 
in to dispose of the waste. See Lawrence Flint, Shaping Nuclear Waste Policy at the Juncture 
of Federal and State Law, 28 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 163, 169 (2000). DOE backed out 
of its obligations, and, in 1997, several facilities brought massive claims against the govern-
ment seeking more than $50 billion. See id. at 174; DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL DIVISION, FY 
2011 PERFORMANCE BUDGET CONGRESSIONAL SUBMISSION 29 (2010), http://www.justice.
gov/sites/default/files/jmd/legacy/2014/01/27/fy11-civ-justification.pdf [hereinafter DOJ 
2011 BUDGET]. One COFC judge took jurisdiction over the claim, and another COFC 
judge dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See Flint, supra note 198, at 175. The Federal Circuit 
reviewed the cases together and affirmed the COFC’s jurisdiction. See id. at 176. The D.C. 
Circuit dismissed a separate suit seeking equitable relief for lack of jurisdiction. See id. The 
Supreme Court declined to grant certiorari of the D.C. Circuit’s dismissal in 2000, finally 
ending the jurisdictional debate three years after the first SNF suit was initiated. See id. at 
177. DOJ budget documents indicate that the government spent in excess of $10 million per 
year litigating these cases, DOJ 2011 BUDGET, supra note 198; and, as of 2011, “nearly $170 
million defending DOE in these lawsuits,” Kimbery Reome & Krista Haley, Spent Nuclear 
Fuel and the U.S. Response to Fukushima, ABA (Nov. 21, 2011), http://apps.americanbar.
org/litigation/committees/energy/articles/fall2011-spent-nuclear-fuel.html.
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to litigate, particularly when the options are all courts within the same legal 
system that will apply the same law.”199
These inefficiencies are exacerbated by the DOJ’s mandate-driven reputation 
for relentlessly disputing threshold issues like jurisdiction. It is shortsighted at 
best—and, at worst, disrespectful of the private sector’s resources—to encour-
age agencies to sponsor prize competitions without prospectively planning for 
where and how disputes will be resolved. 200 Although critics of the govern-
ment’s bid protest regime remain, and there is plenty of room to debate how 
waivers of sovereign immunity should be executed,201 maintaining a credible 
bid protest regime has become a globally accepted standard in government 
contracting for good reason:202 contractors competing for the government’s 
business are in a unique position to enforce rules that prevent their competi-
199 Bowen, 487 U.S. at 930 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
200 See supra note 148.
201 Critics of the government’s bid protest regime complain that these exceptional federal 
waivers of sovereign immunity are unnecessary and inefficient because, inter alia, they generate 
increased transaction costs, bureaucratic anxiety, and mission-paralyzing delays. We join those 
who believe these well-trodden, oft-hysterical critiques have been largely and consistently 
refuted. For an empirical analysis of the costs and benefits of the U.S. bid protest system, 
see Daniel I. Gordon, Bid Protests: The Costs are Real, But the Benefits Outweigh Them, 42 
PUB. CONT. L.J. 489, 501–10 (2013). The author explains:
[T]he costs that bid protests impose on the acquisition system are often misunderstood 
and therefore overstated, in terms of the frequency of protests, the length of time that 
they last, and the risk that an agency’s choice of contractor will be overturned in the 
process. Moreover, the benefits of the protest system may not be fully appreciated, as 
is the fact that the United States is required by its international trade agreements to 
have a protest system.
Id. at 510; see also Daniel I. Gordon, Dissecting GAO’s Bid Protest ‘Effectiveness Rate’, 56 
GOV’T. CONTRACTOR ¶ 25 (2014).
202 See World Trade Organization, Revised Agreement on Government Procurement, 
Article XVIII, at 23–24, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/rev-gpr-
94_01_e.pdf; see also Robert D. Anderson, William E. Kovacic & Anna Caroline Müller, 
Ensuring Integrity and Competition in Public Procurement Markets: A Dual Challenge for Good 
Governance, in THE WTO REGIME ON GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT: CHALLENGE AND 
REFORM 681, 681–718 (Sue Arrowsmith & Robert D. Anderson, eds., 2011) (discussing 
the means through which competition in public procurement markets is promoted); THE 
WORLD BANK, Attachment 1: Elements that Constitute a Well Functioning Public Procurement 
System, in COUNTRY PROCUREMENT ASSESSMENT REPORTS 13 (2002), available at http://
siteresources.worldbank.org/PROCUREMENT/Resources/cpar.pdf (“Robust mechanisms 
for enforcement . . . include the right to . . . a bidder complaints review mechanism . . . .”); 
Collin D. Swan, Lessons From Across the Pond: Comparable Approaches to Balancing Contractual 
Efficiency and Accountability in the U.S. Bid Protest and European Procurement Review Systems, 
43 PUB. CONT. L.J. 29, 30 (2013) (“[M]any procurement systems around the world have 
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tors from gaining an unfair advantage.203 Regarding those incentives, prize 
contests participants are similarly situated to government contractors, and no 
sound basis demonstrates that prize contestants should be less able to protect 
themselves from arbitrary, capricious, or, at worst, corrupt, agency action.
Congress, the creator and tailor of waivers of sovereign immunity, could 
explicitly eliminate the possibility of judicial review or mandate exactly where204 
and how such judicial review will occur.205 Allowing agencies to consume 
valuable private sector resources and dole out prize money without the pos-
sibility of independent review is unwise. Unfettered prize authority counters 
the intent of the prize program by dis-incentivizing participation.206 Without 
the possibility of convenient and meaningful review, prospective contestants 
implemented procedures that allow unsuccessful tenderers . . . to challenge procurements 
they believe were awarded unlawfully.”).
203 See Steven L. Schooner, Fear of Oversight: The Fundamental Failure of Businesslike Gov-
ernment, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 627, 684–85 (2001) (“[P]rotests and disputes serve to correct 
hopefully rare incidents of (at best) inadvertent or (at worst) illegal, arbitrary, or capricious 
agency action. . . . [C]ontractors long have played a vital role in monitoring most aspects 
of the procurement cycle.”).
204 Despite occasionally identifying strategic and practical differences that disappointed 
contestants should consider, advice on which of the three forums is most capable of resolv-
ing prize disputes is beyond the scope of this article. Practitioners may wish to begin with 
Schaengold, Guiffré & Gill, supra note 108. For a discussion on the GAO’s success as a 
forum for resolving bid protests, see Gordon, Bid Protests, supra note 202; Schooner, Fear 
of Oversight, supra note 204, at 681, 691. For insight into the effectiveness of the COFC as 
a judicial forum, see supra note 128. For those curious as to whether the Federal Circuit’s 
right of review of COFC decisions can bring conformity to the disaggregated nature of 
COFC opinions, see Schooner, A Random Walk: The Federal Circuit’s 2010 Government 
Contracts Decisions, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1067, 1067–68 (2011) (“Despite the large number 
of potentially precedential opinions issued by . . . the Federal Circuit . . . , the government 
contracts cases . . . lack significant volume, thematic coherence, or dramatic impact.”); see 
also Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit As a Federal Court, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1791, 
1802 (2013) (“It is not clear whether the Federal Circuit has brought uniformity, quality, or 
efficiency to patent law.”); Sapna Kumar, The Accidental Agency?, 65 FLA. L. REV. 229, 233 
(2013) (“[T]he Federal Circuit needs the power to create binding bright-line rules. But the 
Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the use of these rules, thereby reducing the lower 
court’s ability to provide uniformity in patent law.”).
205 Krent, supra note 99, at 1538 (“Congress in essence monitors its own conduct by 
determining when waiver is appropriate.”).
206 Indeed, one of the earliest waivers of sovereign immunity was meant to quell contrac-
tor concerns that they could not seek a remedy in court for government wrongdoing. For an 
extensive discussion of sovereign immunity applied to government contracts, see Seamon, 
supra note 118, at 160.
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cannot be expected to invest significant resources into a prize contest, particu-
larly if the contest rules require them to forfeit intellectual property rights.207
While Congress should waive some of the sovereign’s immunity, that waiver 
need not be unlimited in scope.208 Judicial review increases the administrative 
costs of contests,209 and the government expends the cost of administering 
prize contests to purchase solutions, not lawsuits. Congress should only allow 
judicial review of prize contests to the extent that litigation-related costs do 
not outweigh the benefits conferred by the prize contest system as a whole.210
Indeed, wide-ranging federal court judicial review of prize contest disputes 
may not prove necessary or prudent. Accordingly, we advocate only for suf-
ficient due process to provide systemic transparency, encourage participation 
by wary contestants, and maintain credible oversight of agency expenditures 
of federal dollars.211 For example, Frankel’s depiction of the FTC’s response 
to his initial request for submission evaluations after the Robocall Challenge, 
was, in essence, that the FTC received over 800 contest submissions and 
207 See Krent, supra note 99, at 1564–65 (“Congress first waived the executive branch’s 
immunity from contract suit prior to the Civil War. . . . The waiver was viewed as indispens-
able . . . , for without it, qualified private contractors might not undertake government projects 
and the government could not obtain the goods and services it needed at affordable prices.”).
208 Even in the government contracts realm, where Congress recognized the need to waive 
immunity to some degree, that waiver is not complete:
Despite the United States general waiver of immunity from suit for breach of con-
tract . . . , Congress and the courts have directed that special contract rules apply to the 
government, allowing it to escape the full consequences of a breach in many settings. 
The government generally need not pay full damages upon terminating a contract for 
its convenience, nor need it usually pay damages when a sovereign act of government 
interferes with the private contractor’s performance of a government contract.
Krent, supra note 99, at 1565–66.
209 Abramowicz, supra note 1, at 208 (noting that whether the litigation costs associated 
with allowing judicial review of prize contest are worthwhile “depends on the benefits litigation 
offers—for example, in improving the accuracy of the prize system, in preventing excessive 
rewards based on faulty data, or even in assuring the due process rights of prize applicants”).
210 See id. (“[T]he costs of such litigation, including both the cost to the parties and the 
cost to the executive and judicial branches, are social costs that offset any benefits of the prize 
system.”). Each of the fora that we discuss has experience managing this issue, and we are 
confident they can analogize and apply that experience in this context. See, e.g., 4 C.F.R. § 
21.0(a)(1): “Interested party means an actual or prospective bidder or offeror whose direct 
economic interest would be affected by the award of a contract or by the failure to award 
a contract.”
211 GAO, for the most part, has maintained its statutory mandate of offering expeditious, 
efficient, and independent review of a high volume of agency procurement decisions. See 31 
U.S.C. § 3554(a)(1) (2012); Schaengold, Guiffré & Gill, supra note 108, at 297.
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does not provide feedback for high-volume contests.212 We do not belittle the 
administrative burden of potentially providing all 800-plus contestants with 
the documented evaluations of every submission. That burden would almost 
certainly justify some limitation of due process compared to the process given 
to the relatively few disappointed government contractors in a bid protest. 
We do not argue that disappointed prize contestants be given the same due 
process as government contractors, only that Congress and prize-sponsoring 
agencies recognize the need for some due process for prize contestants, and 
clearly state the nature of that process before the contest instead of leaving it 
up to the courts to determine after the fact.213
Unless and until Congress acts, agencies should anticipate disputes and 
proactively incorporate dispute resolution clauses into competition rules. 
There is no guarantee that the clause will be controlling in future litigation, 
but giving the parties an expectation of review at the outset will help encour-
age participation and quell contestant fear of unreviewable agency decisions.
212 See Complaint at Ex. 6, 3–4, Frankel v. United States, 118 Fed. Cl. 332 (2014) (No. 
13-546).
213 While we assert that Congress and prize-sponsoring agencies are better suited than 
courts to tailor appropriate due process for prize contestants, we concede that any attempt 
to do so will likely be a work in progress, evolving as experience reveals the most efficient 
means of prize contests dispute resolution. History leaves no doubt that any attempt to 
provide relief will eventually be revised. The bid protest process at GAO has been amended 
many times. See generally Alex D. Tomaszczuk & John E. Jensen, The Adjudicatory Arm of 
Congress—The GAO’s Sixty-Year Role in Deciding Government Contract Bid Protests Comes 
Under Renewed Attack by the Department of Justice, 29 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 399, 402–03 
(generally summarizing evolving nature of GAO bid protests and noting that GAO itself 
recognized that its initial bid protests powers stemmed from dubious statutory authority).
The courts and Congress have tweaked the government’s waiver of immunity for contract-
related claims brought in district courts several times as well. In 1940, the Supreme Court 
held that disappointed bidders lacked standing to sue the government in federal court, because 
procurement law “was not enacted for the protection of sellers and confers no enforceable 
rights upon prospective bidders.” Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 125–26 (1940). 
Six years later, the APA permitted judicial review of final executive agency action, but it was 
not until 1970 that the D.C. Circuit interpreted the APA to provide judicial resolution of 
bid protests. See Scanwell Labs., Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859, 865, 869 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
Shortly after, with the Sunset provision of the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996 
(“ADRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-320, §12(d), 110 Stat. 3870, 3874–75, noted in 28 U.S.C. § 1491 
(2012), Congress removed federal court jurisdiction to resolve bid protests and consolidated 
bid protests into the GAO and the COFC. See generally Steven L. Schooner, Watching the 
Sunset: Anticipating GAO’s Study of Concurrent Bid Protest Jurisdiction in the COFC and the 
District Courts, 42 GOV’T. CONTRACTOR ¶ 108 (2000).
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Conclusion: Do the Right Thing214
The federal government’s burgeoning use of prize contests as a low-cost, 
entrepreneurial alternative to government contracts and grants is one of the 
most significant and exciting, yet inevitably destabilizing, public policy develop-
ments of the decade. We cannot wait to see the potentially groundbreaking, if 
not paradigm-shifting, technological solutions ultimately spawned by the use 
of these powerful innovation-incentivizing tools. That said, the administrative 
law community cannot suppress its concern with the risks inherent in what is 
obviously a not fully matured federally administered prize regime. Whether a 
rush to deploy this powerful tool without considering how much due process 
competitors deserve and how they might obtain meaningful review of agency 
prize awards will derail the prize regime’s momentum remains to be seen.
Experience teaches us that the government’s failure to provide a mean-
ingful avenue for judicial review of prize contests is a recipe for disaster. 
Despite their best intentions, government officials will make mistakes—and 
unchecked authority to spend private sector resources without oversight cre-
ates an unnecessary, unwarranted, and unacceptable opportunity for abuse 
of power.215 Concurrently, the potential for a theoretically infinite number of 
disappointed prize contestants to flood federal district courts, the COFC, and 
the GAO with complicated disputes and inevitable jurisdictional quandaries 
is too real a threat to ignore. Absent Congressional intervention, the judiciary 
might take decades of litigation to sort out, in a piece-meal fashion, a rubric 
for contestants to obtain judicial review. Until then, the lack of due process 
potentially serves as a powerful disincentive for the most talented prospec-
tive contestants—once they lose confidence in the system—to continue to 
compete, thereby diluting the government’s access to innovators. Moreover, 
the form of judicial review that is ultimately fashioned by the courts may 
prove too cumbersome to be practical. Unlike the courts, Congress and prize-
sponsoring agencies have flexibility to stipulate a broad array of due process 
protections for disappointed contestants, which could keep a vast majority, if 
not all, prize contest disputes out of the already over-burdened court system.
214 With apologies to Spike Lee. DO THE RIGHT THING (Universal Pictures 1989).
215 We think it not only reasonable, but prudent to ask: “Who watches the watchmen?” 
From the Latin, “quis custodiet ipsos custodes?” See JUVENAL, SATIRE VI at 95:347–48, in THE 
SIXTEEN SATIRES OF JUVENAL (S.H. Jeves trans., 1885); JUVENAL, SATIRE VI at 84:347–48, 
in THE SATIRES OF JUVENAL (T.H.S. Escott trans., 1869). Today, however, many associate 
the phrase with the ground-breaking comic book series, later converted into a best-selling 
graphic novel, ALAN MOORE & DAVE GIBBONS, WATCHMEN (1987), and the fan-boy screen 
adaptation, WATCHMEN (Warner Bros. Pictures 2009). See DAVE KLOCK, HOW TO READ 
SUPERHERO COMICS AND WHY 62 (2002).
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We applaud the path-breaking government officials willing to experiment 
with prize contests to help solve the government’s most vexing problems 
in an effort to serve the public in a cost-effective manner as expeditiously 
as possible. Nonetheless, the sovereign must use prizes responsibly.216 By 
design, effective prize competitions create losers, not all of whom will—or, 
indeed, should—walk away quietly. Currently, obtaining meaningful review 
of a federally administered prize contest requires uncertain, inefficient, and 
non-productive jurisdictional litigation. The Government can, and should, 
preemptively stipulate where and how independent, objective, and credible 
adjudicatory bodies (whether judicial or quasi-judicial) will resolve prize contest 
disputes. Ideally, Congress will act. Until Congress does so, contest-sponsoring 
agencies should respect the private sector’s resources and incorporate dispute 
resolution clauses into their competition guidelines and, if necessary, establish 
and staff credible, independent fora. For now, as the Government buries its 
head in the sand, contestants play the government’s game at their own risk.
216 “With great power comes great responsibility.” SPIDER-MAN (Columbia Pictures 2002).
